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ABSTRACT 
American leaders face tough decisions about the role of biodefense in homeland 
security.  Debate centers on U.S. preparedness for biological attack, but few if any have 
adequately defined “preparedness.”  This thesis defines bioterrorism preparedness in 
terms of detection and attribution.  Through case studies of the 1984 Rajneeshee cult and 
2001 U.S. anthrax attacks, the thesis develops a notional model of biodefense that shows 
that nature of attack and the lethality or type of agent influence outbreak detection and 
biological weapons attribution.  Because public health surveillance facilitates detection 
and interagency coordination facilitates attribution, there is a need to re-balance U.S. 
biodefense priorities by easing emphasis on current programs, and redirecting resources 
to simpler improvements in communication and organizational efficiency.  Core 
limitations of the public health system that impede surveillance are discussed, and 
barriers between public health and law enforcement officials that hamper coordination 
are examined.  Recommendations are provided to improve detection through better 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION: A CASE FOR DETECTION AND ATTRIBUTION .............1 
A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................4 
1. Case Selection .......................................................................................4 
2. The Rajneeshees ...................................................................................5 
3. The Anthrax Attacks ...........................................................................6 
B. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES.............................................................8 
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION..........................................................................10 
II. THE RAJNEESHEE CULT BIOLOGICAL ATTACKS......................................13 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................13 
B. CASE SUMMARY.........................................................................................14 
1. Organization and Key Players..........................................................14 
2. Motivations .........................................................................................17 
3. Intentions ............................................................................................20 
C. NATURE OF ATTACK AND TARGET ....................................................22 
D. AGENT SELECTION AND ACQUISITION.............................................25 
E. SURVEILLANCE AND EPIDEMIOLOGY...............................................27 
1. Initial Reports.....................................................................................27 
2. First Response ....................................................................................28 
3. Epidemiological Investigation...........................................................29 
4. Suspicions and Initial Epidemiological Reports..............................30 
F. DETECTION AND ATTRIBUTION ..........................................................31 
G. CASE FINDINGS ..........................................................................................35 
III. THE U.S. ANTHRAX ATTACKS ...........................................................................39 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................39 
B. CASE SUMMARY.........................................................................................40 
C. NATURE OF ATTACK AND TARGET ....................................................45 
D. AGENT CONTROVERSY ...........................................................................47 
1. Anthrax and Its Potential Impact.....................................................47 
2. State versus Non-State Connection ..................................................48 
3. “Weaponized” versus “Pure” ...........................................................52 
E. SURVEILLANCE AND EPIDEMIOLOGY...............................................53 
F. DETECTION AND ATTRIBUTION ..........................................................56 
1. “Anthrax Happens” ...........................................................................56 
2. Suspicions Rise ...................................................................................56 
3. Challenges of Coordination...............................................................57 
G. CASE FINDINGS ..........................................................................................58 
IV. TOWARD DETECTION AND ATTRIBUTION...................................................63 
A. CASE COMPARISON ..................................................................................64 
B. NOTIONAL MODEL OF BIODEFENSE ..................................................66 
C. BALANCING NATIONAL PRIORITIES..................................................67 
 viii
D. DETECTION: SURVEILLANCE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
LIMITATIONS..............................................................................................71 
1. Detection, Epidemiology, and Surveillance Defined in Terms of 
Public Health ......................................................................................71 
2. Composition and limits of the U.S. Public Health System .............73 
a. Limitation: Organizational Structure ....................................75 
b. Limitation: Laboratory Capacity ............................................77 
c. Limitation: The National Detection System...........................79 
3. The National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS) .............81 
E. ATTRIBUTION: COOPERATION AND COLLABORATIVE 
NETWORKS..................................................................................................83 
1. Managing Nature of Attack ..............................................................83 
2. Roles in the Surveillance and Epidemiological Process..................87 
3. Forensic Epidemiology and Existing Barriers to Coordination ....88 
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................93 
A. THE FUTURE FRAMEWORK OF BIOTERRORISM ...........................93 
1. Terrorists Are Managing Capabilities .............................................94 
2. Mass Effects vs. Mass Destruction ...................................................95 
3. The Limits of Attribution for Dissuasion and Deterrence .............97 
B. THE 1950s REVISITED................................................................................98 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS.............................................................................102 
1. Improve Detection Through Better Surveillance..........................102 
2. Improve Attribution through Better Coordination and 
Information Sharing ........................................................................105 
3. Conduct Realistic Training and Large-Scale Exercises ...............109 
LIST OF REFERENCES....................................................................................................113 
 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. “Comparison of State Biological WMD and Terrorist Biological Agent 
Development.” (From: Congressional Research Service Report, Small-
scale Terrorist Attacks Using Chemical and Biological Agents:  An 
Assessment Framework and Preliminary Comparisons, May 20, 2004, 
CRS-15.) ..........................................................................................................22 
Figure 2. Rajneeshee Attack Epidemiological Curve. (From: Török et al., Figure 
10.1 in A Large Community Outbreak of Salmonellosis Caused by 
Intentional Contamination of Restaurant Salad Bars, 173.) ............................33 
Figure 3. 2001 Anthrax Timeline. (From: Toward a National Biodefense Strategy: 
Challenges and Opportunities. Washington, D.C: Center for 
Counterproliferation Research, 2003, 10, 
http://www.ndu.edu/centercounter/CCR%202003.pdf (accessed December 
20, 2005).)........................................................................................................40 
Figure 4. 2001 Anthrax Contaminated Facilities. (From: Observations and Lessons 
Learned from Anthrax Response: National Response Team Interim Report 
[Draft]―October to November, 2001, 3, 
http://www.nrt.org/production/NRT/NRTWeb.nsf/AllAttachmentsByTitle/
A-80anthrax/$File/ANTHRAX_Report_07_13_04.pdf?OpenElement 
(accessed November 26, 2005).)......................................................................41 
Figure 5. Surveillance facilitates detection. ....................................................................67 
Figure 6. Interagency cooperation facilitates attribution.................................................67 
Figure 7. Epidemiological Clues That May Signal a Covert BW Attack. (From: The 
Public Health Response, Exhibit 2, 17.) ..........................................................72 
Figure 8. The Connection between Detection and Response. (From: Wagner et al., 
The Nation's Current Capacity, 6.)..................................................................75 
Figure 9. The National Detection System (From: Wagner et al., The Nation's 
Current Capacity, Figure 3.1, 25.)...................................................................80 
Figure 10. Law Enforcement and Public Health Coordination by Nature of Event – 
Covert BW Attack. (From: Collaboration between Public Health and Law 
Enforcement.)...................................................................................................84 
Figure 11. Law Enforcement and Public Health Coordination by Nature of Event – 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. “Alleged Participants in Salmonella Contamination Activities.” (From: W. 
Seth Carus, Table 8.1 in The Rajneeshees (1984), 125.) .................................17 
Table 2. “Restaurant Contaminations Resulting in Illness in The Dalles, Oregon.” 
(From: W. Seth Carus, Table 8.2 in The Rajneeshees (1984), 132.) ...............28 
Table 3. The “Amerithrax” Medical Cases. (From: UCLA Department of 
Epidemiology, School of Public Health, 
http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/detect/antdetect_list.html (accessed 
March 1, 2006).) ..............................................................................................42 
Table 4. Surveillance partners. (From: The Public Health Response, July 2001, 14.) ..69 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ATCC American Type Culture Collection 
BARDA Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority 
BSL Biosafety Level 
BW Biological Weapon(s) 
BWC Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
CONPLAN Concept of Operations Plan 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DOD Department of Defense 
EIS Epidemic Intelligence Service 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
GAO General Accounting Office 
HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
HRSA Health Resource and Services Administration 
LRN Laboratory Response Network 
NBACC National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center 
NBIS National Biosurveillance Integration System 
RMC Rajneesh Medical Corporation 
SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
SNS Strategic National Stockpile 
TOPOFF Top Officials Exercise 
UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission 
USAMRIID United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease 
USPS United States Postal Service 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank several people whose help made this thesis possible.  First, I 
express gratitude to my advisors, Professors Peter Lavoy and Anne Clunan.  Professor 
Lavoy’s class on counterproliferation sparked my interest in the topic and his direction 
kept an enormous project focused and manageable.  Professor Clunan’s expertise in 
organizational theory, and her research into building trusted networks for biological 
weapons attribution, greatly influenced much of my work.  Special thanks go to Professor 
Craig Hooper of the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS).  Professor 
Hooper served as an additional reader and directed the study of the thesis’ core section, 
Chapter IV.  He provided important research material and fresh ideas based on his 
expertise as Scientist-in-Residence of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.  I am also 
grateful to classmate Chris Thompson who took time away from his work to analyze and 
critique mine. 
I was able to participate in one workshop and a state-wide exercise that greatly 
contributed to the results.  I would like to thank Professor Raymond Zilinskas of MIIS 
who organized the bioterrorism workshop I attended, and Cindy Lambdin of U.C. 
Berkeley’s Center for Infectious Disease Preparedness, School of Public Health, who 
facilitated the table-top exercise.  An interview was also conducted with Mrs. Lambdin 
during California’s Golden Guardian 2006 emergency response exercise.  Additional 
thanks go to Dave Sullivan of San Francisco’s Office of Emergency Services and 
Homeland Security.  Mr. Sullivan led the simulation cell during Golden Guardian and 
allowed me to take part in the event. 
Of course, the process of actually completing this thesis would have been 
impossible without the support of my family.  I am indebted to and tremendously grateful 
for my wife Cynthia, whose support and encouragement saw me through.  And to my 
sons Bradley, Adrian, and Ryan, who to me symbolize the future of America and serve as 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION: A CASE FOR DETECTION AND 
ATTRIBUTION 
Accessible, extremely destructive weapons that can be delivered by 
clandestine means represent a significant vulnerability, one which can be 
regarded as ‘small’ only in the sense that few aggressors have chosen to 
exploit it.  We hope this threat continues to lie dormant, but believe it is 
imprudent to assume that it will.1 
American leaders face tough decisions about biodefense and its role in homeland 
security.  Some debate U.S. preparedness for biological attack, but few if any have 
adequately defined “preparedness.”  This thesis defines bioterrorism preparedness in 
terms of detection and attribution.  It does this by analyzing the U.S. response in two 
cases:  the Salmonella contamination of food by the Rajneesh cult in 1984, and 
epidemiological response to the anthrax attacks of 2001.  Comparative case study will 
reveal the criticality of bioterrorism detection and attribution.  These two requirements 
will then be compared to current U.S. biodefense programs to assess the extent to which 
the United States is adequately prepared.  The results will show that medical surveillance, 
epidemiology, and the public health sector’s coordination with emergency services and 
law enforcement remain the weakest links.  This work is not concerned with assessing the 
threat of bioterrorism—it proceeds on the premise that policymakers are concerned and 
will continue to fund U.S. programs.  Moreover, it is not about bioterror mitigation or 
prevention—it presumes successful attacks are inevitable, even if only low-grade or small 
in scale.  Rather, this thesis is about U.S. response and what defines good preparedness.  
The practical significance of its findings should permit policymakers to make informed 
decisions about interagency communication and networks at federal, state, and local 
levels of government.  More importantly, the conceptual significance is that 
organizational structure and public-private partnerships may play a greater role in 
countering modern terrorism than previously thought. 
At the time of this writing the World Health Organization reports the human-to-
human spread of avian influenza H5N1 in Indonesia, U.S. Navy officials are testing 
                                                 
1 Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel: 
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), xvii. 
2 
4,200 sailors and 1,200 visiting guests of the USS Ronald Regan for tuberculosis, and an 
outbreak of E. Coli from contaminated spinach is spreading across the United States.  The 
first sparks fears of a global pandemic surpassing the 1918 worldwide influenza 
outbreak.2  The second has U.S. officials considering whether to test high-ranking 
military officers from the People’s Republic of China for tuberculosis.3  The third affects 
a $180 million dollar-a-year crop and is costing spinach farmers $50 to $100 million 
dollars a month.4  Whether natural or deliberate, disease neither discriminates among 
populations nor respects international borders.  It can have direct national security affects 
on troops and war-fighting readiness, or it can surreptitiously degrade a state’s economy 
and critical infrastructure.  While the events above have not been linked to terrorism per 
se, our ability to 1) rapidly detect outbreaks, and 2) characterize them as attacks and 
irrefutably attribute them to the perpetrators becomes nothing less than an essential core 
national capability.  Investing in such capabilities produces synergistic returns.  These 
include societal benefits from fighting emerging infectious disease by the private and 
public health sector, and national security benefits from bolstering U.S. dissuasion and 
deterrence postures against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism by the 
defense establishment.5 
Finally, the tenuous link between money spent and potential future lives saved 
makes this issue important to national leaders.  Debate continues to center on the low 
probability-high consequence nature of a biological attack compared to the large amounts 
                                                 
2 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Avian Influenza: Current Situation,” 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/outbreaks/current.htm (accessed September 27, 2006). 
3 Larry Shaughnessy, “Navy Tests Entire USS Reagan Crew for Tuberculosis,” CNN.com, 
http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/situation.room/blog/2006/07/navy-tests-entire-uss-reagan-crew-
for.html (accessed September 27, 2006). 
4 National Broadcast Corporation, “Feds: New Safety Plan Required Before Spinach Is Sold: E. Coli 
Source Discovered in Refrigerator,” NBC11.com, http://www.nbc11.com/news/9903292/detail.html 
(accessed September 27, 2006) and Cable News Network, “FDA: E. Coli Linked to Natural Selection 
Foods,” CNN.com, http://www.cnn.com/2006/HEALTH/09/15/tainted.spinach.ap/index.html (accessed 
September 27, 2006). 
5 Michael Barletta, “Assessing Risks and Crafting Responses,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies 
Occasional Papers 65, no. 8 (May 2002), 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?v21=73370andid=14675 (accessed October 2, 2006), and The 
White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, DC: The White House, September 
2006), 14-15, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf (accessed September 20, 2006). 
3 
invested in biodefense programs.6  With some $30 billion spent in the four years since the 
2001 anthrax attacks, and with the seeming lack of a biological threat since that time, the 
field is ripe for both scholarly and political debate.7  However, what if these expenditures 
and future budgeted biodefense dollars do little to actually improve preparedness?  What 
if we learned the wrong lessons from previous events, and are over-weighting national 
biodefense programs and infrastructure development at the expense of uncomplicated 
training and interagency cooperation improvements?  Projects BioShield, BioWatch, 
BioSense, and the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center are the 
basis of today’s publicly announced U.S. strategy.8  Yet consider that no amount of pre-
positioned vaccine from BioShield and the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) will help if 
state and local officials can not access, control, and distribute the medical 
countermeasures.  BioWatch sensors are meaningless if those monitoring do not relay 
warnings to the people who need them most.9  Lastly, the BioSense national architecture 
will only be as good as the effectiveness of stakeholders using the system.  Medical 
officials, physicians, pharmacies, and many others must embrace and use the network.  
While these consequence management capabilities are important, it also follows that 
“extraordinary measures are not necessary to develop a comprehensive terrorism health 
                                                 
6 Jessica Stern, “Terrorist Motivations and Unconventional Weapons,” in Planning the Unthinkable: 
How New Powers Will use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, ed. Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. 
Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 203. 
7 Milton Leitenberg cites an 18-fold increase in civilian biodefense expenditures in the past four fiscal 
years. He says the bioterror threat is over exaggerated, and that federal funds are inappropriately used when 
compared to the public health impact of other common diseases. Milton Leitenberg, “Assessing the 
Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat,” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, December 2005), 4, 65. 
8 These programs are covered in more detail in Chapter IV. BioShield deals with production and 
stockpiling of next generation medical countermeasures. BioWatch is a series of biological sensors 
strategically placed across the United States to detect agent release. BioSense is a web-based system 
combining laboratories, clinics, medical and public officials, BioWatch sensors, and other assets into a 
national architecture to increase situational awareness of possible disease outbreaks. The National 
Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center is the first U.S. laboratory specifically focused on 
biodefense research. 
9 Inconclusive tests prevented the Department of Homeland Security from notifying federal and local 
health agencies that sensors in the Washington, D.C. National Mall had detected tularemia. The Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention did not learn of the biosensor readings for at least 72 hours, and it took five 
days for D.C.–area health agencies to receive the news. National Journal Group, “Inconclusive Test Results 
Cited in Delayed Tularemia Notification to Federal, Local Health Agencies,” Global Security Newswire, 
http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2005/10/5/35653f39-93ee-416f-9540-a8cc79aaf652.html (accessed 
December 20, 2005). 
4 
surveillance and epidemiologic network.”10  The correct allocation of limited federal, 
state, and local resources makes this issue important.  Today’s passive defense programs, 
which  account for most all biodefense dollars, will be meaningless if the organizational 
challenges mentioned above are not addressed. 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Case Selection 
The 1984 Rajneesh cult and 2001 anthrax attacks cases are selected for four 
reasons.  First, the cases are important in different ways.  Rajneesh was the first 
documented biological weapons (BW) attack in the United States resulting in mass 
casualties, and for the first time challenged public health and law enforcement 
cooperation.  The 2001 U.S. anthrax attacks, otherwise known as “Amerithrax,”11 
marked the first use of a lethal pathogen for terror on U.S. soil.  Second, each 
demonstrates how the nature of BW attack (covert vs. overt) is directly related to an 
attacker’s objectives, their agent selection, and the ultimate outcomes.  Third, the events 
occurred under very different national circumstances and levels of public awareness, yet 
highlighted similar gaps in our nation’s ability to manage biological crisis.  Last and most 
importantly, these two cases are indicative of the types of attacks the United States may 
face in the future.  “Chemical and biological weapons used in the past have not always 
been chosen for the highest potential fatalities, but rather for other reasons.”12  The 
bioterror framework of the future suggests small-scale, specifically targeted attacks to 
create mass effect vs. mass casualties.  What is more, these will likely be waged by non-
state actors determined to escalate violence and climb the necessary technology-
capability curve to achieve strategic objectives.  It is for these reasons that the 1984 
Rajneesh and 2001 Amerithrax cases are selected while other are omitted. 
                                                 
10 Department of Health and Human Services, The Public Health Response to Biological and 
Chemical Terrorism: Interim Planning Guidance for State Public Health Officials (Atlanta, GA: Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, July 2001), 15, 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Documents/Planning/PlanningGuidance.PDF (accessed March 28, 2006). 
11 FBI case name for the ongoing criminal investigation into the 2001 U.S. anthrax attacks. Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, “Amerithrax: The Search for Anthrax,” http://www.fbi.gov/anthrax/searchant.htm 
(accessed November 27, 2005). 
12 Dana A. Shea and Frank Gottron, Small-Scale Terrorist Attacks using Chemical and Biological 
Agents: An Assessment Framework and Preliminary Comparisons (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service, May 20, 2004), i, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/33629.pdf (accessed 
March 28, 2006). 
5 
2. The Rajneeshees 
In 1984 the Rajneesh cult succeeded with the fist documented bioterror incident in 
the United States.  Until then, there had been 222 bioterror related incidents in the United 
States with only 24 being confirmed attacks.  Of these, only the Rajneesh attack had 
resulted in mass casualties.13  The group conspired to unseat the local government of The 
Dalles, Oregon, by using Salmonella typhimurium to sicken voters and swing an 
upcoming election.14  The cult ordered and received bactrol disks from a Seattle medical 
supply company.  Key members used a laboratory with an incubator and freeze dryer to 
culture what they called salmonella “salsa.”15  Beginning August 29, 1984, several 
Rajneeshees sprinkled the salsa “in personal drinking glasses, on doorknobs and urinal 
handles, on produce at the local supermarket, and on salad bars in eleven restaurants.”16  
Their attack hospitalized 45, caused 751 to fall ill, and would serve as a historical 
benchmark of bioterrorism in the United States. 
By late 1984 local public health officials concluded the outbreaks were 
accidentally caused by contaminated food handlers.  It took only four days for local 
health care providers to identify Salmonella typhimurium as the source, but over a year 
for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to file its final report and 
confirm that a single strain had caused all of the illnesses.17  The attacks went 
unattributed to bioterrorism until the cult fractured from within.  In September 1985, the 
Rajneesh leader publicly accused others in the group of mismanagement and  
 
 
                                                 
13 Henry S. Parker, “Agricultural Bioterrorism: A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat,” McNair Paper 
65 (March 2002), 19, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/mcnair65.pdf (accessed November 26, 
2005). 
14 Raymond A. Zilinskas, “Biocriminality and Bioterrorism: Assessing the Threats,” (Monterey 
Institute of International Studies, November 4, 2005), slides 25-29. Presentation given as part of Workshop 
548, “Simulating a Deliberately Caused Foodborne Disease Outbreak Using the Table-top Exercise 
(TTX),” held at Monterey Institute of International Studies on 4 and 12 November, 2005. 
15 Per Anderson, “The Rajneeshee Cult,” Passagen, 




poisonings.18  The Oregon Attorney General directed a joint task force between state 
police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that eventually led to the group’s 
demise. 
A combination of slow medical surveillance and poor law enforcement integration 
with the public health system suggests a lack of preparedness for this biological attack.  
The Rajneesh cult event was the first case to reveal the vulnerability of civilian 
populations to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear terrorism.19  Likewise, it 
changed public health and law enforcement perspectives regarding bioterrorism, but did 
little to advance genuine biodefense preparedness in the United States. 
3. The Anthrax Attacks 
The use of Bacillus anthracis through the U.S. Postal System marks the first 
biological attack on American soil in the twenty-first century.20  The attacks resulted in 
11 inhalational cases and five deaths, and the terrorist(s) remain at large today.21  A 
detailed review shows the United States was far from having a comprehensive national 
biodefense strategy despite lessons learned from the 1984 Rajneesh attacks and 
reasonable attempts to improve preparedness.  This event was a wake-up call to 
Americans and policymakers alike, and served as a tipping point in national security 
policy that resulted in many of the biodefense initiatives underway today. 
High demand for sample testing met with only modest capability during the 
crisis.22  The Department of Defense provided operational support through the United 
States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease (USAMRIID).  Originally 
designed to only assist with ten samples a month during an emergency, USAMRIID 
received more than 700 samples in a single day during the anthrax investigation, and 
                                                 
18 Zilinskas, Biocriminality and Bioterrorism, November 4, 2005. 
19 Jonathan B. Tucker, “Historical Trends Related to Bioterrorism: An Empirical Analysis,” Emerging 
Infectious Disease 5, no. 4 (1999), 498, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/pdf/tucker.pdf (accessed 
November 26, 2005). 
20 National Defense University, Anthrax in America: A Chronology and Analysis of the Fall 2001 
Attacks (Washington, D.C.: Center for Counterproliferation Research, November 2002), 2, 
http://www.ndu.edu/centercounter/prolif_publications.htm (accessed November 26, 2005). 
21 Barry S. Levy and Victor W. Sidel, Terrorism and Public Health: A Balanced Approach to 
Strengthening Systems and Protecting People (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 105. 
22 National Defense University, Anthrax in America, 6. 
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surged to process more than 14,000 specimens during the crisis.23  Deficiencies were 
identified in information technology.  The General Accounting Office (GAO) found six 
key federal agencies involved in bioterrorism preparedness and response, with some 70 
systems in several information technology categories associated with public health 
emergency support.24  The main areas included detection, surveillance, communication, 
and support technologies.  The report found interoperability to be a major problem.  CDC 
procedures were also reviewed, and questions were raised about oversight effectiveness 
of the Select Agent Transfer Program.  At the time, the CDC’s Laboratory 
Registration/Select Agent Transfer Program safeguarded and maintained positive control 
of 42 designated bacteria, viruses, and toxins.  A November 2002 GAO report found the 
CDC’s oversight left room for improvement.25 
Awareness that infections stemmed from a deliberate act turned what started out 
as a public health response into a law enforcement investigation.  Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and FBI hazardous material teams worked side-by-side, 
searching 280 barrels containing 635 bags of quarantined mail that had been seized as 
evidence.26  Specific protocols were created on-the-fly to satisfy the needs of both federal 
agencies—to contain and clean up for the EPA, and to find and protect evidence leading 
to a criminal conviction for the FBI.27  On the whole, hospital physicians and staffs 
responded well.  However, some misdiagnosis and the resultant unnecessary deaths stand 
out as failures among successes with regard to surveillance and epidemiology.  
Ultimately, the implications of this case for U.S. biodefense preparedness are twofold.  It 
identifies the need for improved interagency cooperation to enhance response, and                                                  
23 National Defense University, Toward a National Biodefense Strategy: Challenges and 
Opportunities (Washington, D.C: Center for Counterproliferation Research, 2003), 41, 
http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion-
image/CCR202003.pdf;http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS31758 (accessed November 27, 2005). 
24 General Accounting Office, Bioterrorism: Information Technology Strategy Could Strengthen 
Federal Agencies’ Abilities to Respond to Public Health Emergencies (Washington, D.C: General 
Accounting Office, 2003), 1, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03139.pdf (accessed November 27, 2005). 
25 General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: CDC's Oversight of the Select Agent Program 
(Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 2002), 1, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03315r.pdf 
(accessed November 27, 2005). 
26 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Amerithrax. 
27 See Amerithrax for a complete account of the FBI/EPA investigative protocols used during the 
search. 
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reveals shortfalls in national systems for disease detection.  The 2001 U.S. anthrax 
attacks “tragically confirmed the importance of disease surveillance, since the speed with 
which doctors recognized the signs of anthrax infection determined whether patients were 
treated immediately or sent home, only to return later to die.”28  It also stressed the 
significance of improving domestic defenses, especially since “many tools used to 
address natural disease threats will be needed to respond to an intentional attack.”29 
In closing remarks before a congressional subcommittee on November 6, 2001, 
RAND policy analyst John Parachini said the anthrax attacks represented “a fundamental 
shift in the nature of the biological terrorism threat.”30  He concluded the attacks should 
prompt government action to strengthen nonproliferation, to deny and dissuade state and 
sub-national groups from using biological weapons, and to “develop rapid means to 
detect an attack and track down the perpetrator should preemptive and preventive 
measures fail.”31  This thesis focuses on the later, which is detection and attribution 
through improved surveillance and interagency cooperation. 
B. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis proceeds in an inductive fashion.  Preliminary comparison of the cases 
reveals a pattern of independent, dependent, and intervening variables.  The Rajneesh 
attack was covert, while the anthrax letters were overt.  The Rajneesh used a non-lethal 
Category B agent, whereas the Amerithrax attacks used a deadly Category A agent.32  
The salmonella event was for the most part undetected and entirely unattributed to 
bioterrorism, while the anthrax episodes were more quickly detected and immediately 
attributed to a BW attack.  Case comparison shows that nature of attack (overt vs. covert) 
and agent type (lethality) are independent variables that cause or facilitate the dependent 
variables of detection and attribution.  Moreover, medical surveillance serves as an 
intervening variable for detection, whereas interagency cooperation, e.g., between the 
                                                 
28 Christopher Chyba, “Toward Biological Security,” Foreign Affairs 81 (May/June 2002): 131. 
29 Ibid., 122. 
30 John Parachini, Anthrax Attacks, Biological Terrorism, and Preventive Responses (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 17, http://www.rand.org/publications/CT/CT186/ (accessed October 15, 
2006). 
31 Ibid. 
32 See http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp for an explanation of CDC agent 
classifications. 
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public health system and law enforcement, serves as an intervening variable for 
attribution.  The cases are run through each variable to illustrate a notional model of 
biodefense in Chapter IV.  Inductive reasoning will show that medical surveillance, 
epidemiology, and the public health sector’s coordination with emergency services and 
law enforcement are essential improvements to shore up U.S. biodefense strategy. 
This thesis defines detection as the regional or national awareness of an outbreak.  
Most outbreaks are effectively detected and managed locally.33  A challenge to U.S. 
biodefense is outbreaks involving cases over a wider area or in multiple local health 
jurisdictions.  These may be easily missed, particularly if the isolated epidemics are 
characterized by a slowly rising number of cases.34  This thesis also defines surveillance 
as a regional or national concern, as surveillance enables detection.  Classical means of 
medical surveillance include sentinel labs and clinician reporting after disease diagnosis.  
Modern methods include “syndromic surveillance,” which covers a host of activities to 
monitor illness such as over-the-counter medication purchases that can forewarn of 
bioterrorism.35  The goal is earlier detection and a timelier public health response, “hours 
or days before disease clusters are recognized clinically, or before specific diagnoses are 
made and reported to public health authorities.”36  Authorities agree that increasing 
surveillance for human and animal pathogens is vital for addressing the menace of 
bioterrorism.37  This is not only because of the demonstrated threat, but also because of 




                                                 
33 Marc-Alain Widdowson et al., “Automated, Laboratory-Based System using the Internet for 
Disease Outbreak Detection, the Netherlands,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 9, no. 9 (September 2003), 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol9no9/02-0450.htm (accessed October 15, 2006). 
34 Ibid. 
35 As of May 2003, CDC estimates U.S. health departments have initiated syndromic surveillance 
systems at approximately 100 sites throughout the country. James W. Buehler et al., “Syndromic 
Surveillance and Bioterrorism-Related Epidemics,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 9, no. 10 (October 2003), 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol9no10/03-0231.htm (accessed October 15, 2006). 
36 Ibid. 
37 Jessica Stern, “Confronting Biological Terrorism: Global Epidemiological Monitoring,” Harvard 
International Review 23, no. 1 (2001), http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1008/ (accessed October 15, 2006). 
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poverty, and international travel and trade also facilitate the movement of microbes to 
new areas and hosts, “further complicating the task of identifying the source of infectious 
disease.”38 
Attribution is defined as a two-level process.  The first tier is differentiating 
between a natural disease outbreak and a malicious attack.  Outbreaks must first be 
detected and characterized as terrorism.  While this seems obvious in theory, history and 
the case studies show it to be more difficult in practice.  The second tier is actually 
tracing back to the perpetrator—the so called ‘return address’ capability.  In sum, the 
Rajneeshee case never got past the first stage to even attempt the second, and underscores 
the need for effective communication and coordination between intelligence, public 
health, and law enforcement officials.  The first level of attribution relies more heavily on 
organizational theory than science, is well within our national capabilities, and represents 
the first line of defense and focus of this thesis. 
Recent U.S. laws, presidential directives, national strategy documents, 
government reports, congressional testimonies, agency briefings, and personal interviews 
were all used as sources of information.  The evolution of applicable laws, directives, and 
strategy documents over the past ten years were also evaluated and applied.  Observation 
and participation in public health exercises also contributed to the thesis.  These include 
direct participation in California’s “Golden Guardian” emergency response exercise held 
in San Francisco on November 15, 2006, as well as bioterrorism-related table-top 
exercises held at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in February 2005. 
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis consists of five chapters.  Chapter I defines the problem and explains 
its importance, establishes the methodology of argument, and introduces the work’s key 
findings.  These are supported by case studies in Chapters II and III, and by literature 
review, exercise participation, and interview information which is presented in Chapter 
IV.  Chapter V concludes by synthesizing the results.  It provides policy 
recommendations intended to enable a comprehensive U.S. biodefense strategy. 
                                                 
38 Stern, Confronting Biological Terrorism. 
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Chapter II examines the Rajneesh cult biological attacks.  More than any other, 
this case demonstrates the inextricable link between an organization’s objectives, its 
agent selection, and ultimate outcomes.  It shows the failure of nonproliferation regimes, 
international and domestic security protocols, and national defense strategies to deter 
certain types of actors and prevent low-grade BW attacks.  It also reveals that mass 
casualties are not always the objective.  On the contrary, the Rajneeshees went to great 
lengths to remain stealth and produce no death.  Finally, this chapter shows the 
importance of attribution—a tough lesson learned from poor interagency coordination 
during the criminal investigation which began a full year after the attacks. 
Chapter III covers the U.S. anthrax attacks.  It illustrates the costly long-term 
effects to government and society from a relatively simple one-off attack.  Amerithrax 
shows that determined actors—whether state-sponsored, transnational, domestic, or lone-
wolf—will not yield in the quest for biological weapons.  They are aptly maneuvering 
through or around the four necessary capabilities.  More than any other case, Amerithrax 
provides a glimpse into the future of countering bioterrorism.  It marks the beginning of 
special investigative protocols between medical, public health, environmental, and law 
enforcement communities.  It highlighted infrastructure shortfalls that prompted today’s 
biodefense initiatives including Projects BioShield, BioWatch, and BioSense; 
refinements in the Strategic National Stockpile and Laboratory Response Network, and 
creation of the National Biological Analysis and Countermeasures Center. 
Chapter IV explains a notional model of biodefense and examines the current U.S. 
strategy.  The composition and limitations of the U.S. public health system are studied.  
These deficiencies are compared to 1) lessons learned from the case studies, and 2) 
current biodefense policy, infrastructure improvements, and programs to expose 
remaining shortfalls in preparedness.  These areas combined reflect our nation’s ability 
for detection of biological attacks.  The chapter then turns to analysis of law 
enforcement’s integration with public health.  It uses the case studies to show the often 
diametrically opposed missions in these fields, and draws upon direct participation in 
bioterror emergency response exercises to demonstrate impediments to effective 
coordination.  This, in turn, reflects our nation’s ability for attribution of biological 
attacks. 
12 
Chapter V concludes by providing policy recommendations.  These call for 
increased national laboratory capacity and incentives for rapid reporting and information 
sharing.  A two-pronged approach is recommended that combines financial incentives 
with joint exercise and training.  The emphasis here is on building trusted networks of 
intelligence, law enforcement, medical, and public health officials—networks that span 
the bridge separating policy and culture on one side, from evidence and science on the 
other. 
13 
II. THE RAJNEESHEE CULT BIOLOGICAL ATTACKS 
Terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening, but 
not a lot of people dead…[explaining why]…terrorists have not done 
some of the terribly damaging and terrifying things they could do, such as 
poisoning a city’s water  supply, spreading chemical or biological agents, 
or other things that could produce mass casualties.39 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In September 1984, the Rajneeshees succeeded in conducting the first 
documented bioterror incident in the United States.  The town of The Dalles, Oregon was 
bewildered by widespread food poisoning from salad bar contaminations that produced 
symptoms ranging from nausea and diarrhea to headache and fever.  Until then, there had 
been only 222 bioterror–related incidents in the United States with only 24 being 
confirmed attacks.  Of these, only the Rajneeshees’ use of a crude biological weapon 
resulted in significant nonfatal casualties, causing 45 to be hospitalized and 751 to fall 
ill.40  Even today, their attacks serve as a defining moment for bioterrorism in the United 
States. 
This chapter begins by summarizing the case.  The cult’s organizational structure 
and key players, their motivations, and the group’s intentions are reviewed.  Nature of 
attack and target selection are considered next.  The incident shows how covert strikes 
can leverage time and incubation periods to result in more casualties than overtly 
announced BW attacks.  With regard to target selection, the cult’s unimpeded success 
against a human population raises serious critical infrastructure protection questions 
about less protected U.S. livestock and crop formations.  The group’s agent selection 
decision and means to acquire and produce biological weapons are also studied.  Finally, 
the surveillance/epidemiology and detection/attribution thesis elements are evaluated in 
light of the Rajneeshee case.  The chapter conclusion discusses distinct findings that can 
be learned and applied to bolster U.S. biodefense strategy. 
                                                 
39 Brian M. Jenkins, “International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict,” in David Carlton and Carlo 
Schaerf, eds., International Terrorism and World Security (London: Croom Helm, 1975), 15, and Brian M. 
Jenkins, “Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?,” Orbis 29, no. 3 (1985), 507-15. 
40 Parker, Agricultural Bioterrorism, 19. 
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B. CASE SUMMARY 
1. Organization and Key Players 
Chandra Mohan was born in Madhya Pradesh, India, in December 1931.  In 1953 
he took the name “Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh,” and later established the Acharya Rajneesh 
Ashram organization in 1974.41  The Indian spiritual leader based his teachings on the 
traditions of Buddha, Krishna, Jesus, Zen masters, Hassidism, and Sufism.42  The 
“Enlightened Master’s” spiritual regimen was based on meditation and uninhibited 
sexuality.  His cult gained an international following and became increasingly notorious 
in Poona, India, the site of its first commune or “ashram.”  By the 1980s, the Rajneeshees 
faced growing hostility and were being pursued by the Indian government for tax 
evasion. 
The Bhagwan’s personal secretary and most trusted follower was Sheela P. 
Silverman, otherwise known as Ma Anand Sheela.43  In 1981 Ma Sheela convinced the 
Bhagwan to immigrate to the United States in search of a new home for the cult.  The 
group operated from a New Jersey mansion before deciding on a suitable location for the 
new ashram.44  It was Sheela who decided to purchase a property in Oregon known to 
locals as the Big Muddy Ranch.  Although the land straddled both Jefferson and Wasco 
Counties, the major portion was in Wasco, a largely rural area with a population of 
approximately 20,000.  The county seat was a small town called The Dalles, which in 
1985 had a population of about 10,000 and is located just over an hour’s drive east of 
Portland on Interstate 84.  The plan was to build a “Buddhafield” or agricultural 
commune where the Rajneeshees could celebrate the enlightened master’s philosophy of 
“beauty, love, and guiltless sex.”45 
                                                 
41 Zilinskas, Biocriminality and Bioterrorism, slides 25-29. 
42 Answers.com, “Rajneesh,” http://www.answers.com/topic/rajneesh (accessed September 20, 2006). 
43 The New York Times, “Former Aides to Guru in Oregon Plead Guilty to Numerous Crimes,” 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/i/immigration_and_refugees/index.html?query
=ONANG,%20DIANNE%20Yandfield=perandmatch=exact (accessed September 20, 2006). 
44 W. Seth Carus, “The Rajneeshees (1984),” in Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist use of Chemical 
and Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 116-8. 
45 Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad, Germs: Biological Weapons and America's 
Secret War (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 15. 
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In 1982 the Bhagwan began to operate under a self-imposed four-year vow of 
silence.  Consequently, he was not directly involved in the day-to-day operations of the 
organization.  Ma Sheela ran much of the commune in his name and her power came 
from meetings she held every evening with the cult leader.  Sheela was the only person 
not in the Bhagwan’s immediate household who had daily contact with him.  It was 
widely understood among Rajneeshees that Sheela represented the Bhagwan, and he 
confirmed that she spoke in his name when doubts arose about her authority.46  Despite 
her favor in the Bhagwan’s eyes and sweeping powers throughout the community, two 
groups emerged in opposition.  First was the Bhagwan’s personal household including a 
handful of people and his personal physician Devaraj.  Sheela resented this group because 
of its personal closeness to the cult leader.  The second group, known as the “Hollywood 
Crowd,” consisted of people whose wealth and fame provided special access to the 
Bhagwan.  Ma Prem Hasya led this crowd and was married to a famous Hollywood 
producer.  Eventually an alliance formed between the two opposition groups when Hasya 
married the household physician Devaraj.47 
Ma Sheela ruled large number of “moms” and more senior “big moms” for which 
she relied to direct daily operations of the commune.48  Only one senior member was 
male besides the Bhagwan himself.  David Berry Knapp, otherwise known as Krishna 
Diva or “K.D,” served as mayor of what would later become the municipality of 
“Rajneeshpuram.”  Of the big moms, Dianne Y. Onang, also known as Ma Anand Puja, 
was the darkest character in the group.49  A licensed family nurse practitioner and 
registered nurse, Ma Puja joined the cult in India in 1979.  Puja enjoyed a special social 
bond with Sheela despite being a recluse who took meals alone.  She was an integral part 
of the inner circle running the community and held several important positions within the 
cult.  As vice president of the Bhagwan’s church, Rajneesh Foundation International, she 
was one of few members who had the power to appoint or remove trustees.50  More 
                                                 
46 Carus, The Rajneeshees, 119. 
47 Ibid., 120. 
48 Ibid., 119. 
49 The New York Times, Former Aides to Guru in Oregon Plead Guilty to Numerous Crimes. 
50 Carus, The Rajneeshees, 121. 
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importantly, Puja wielded absolute control over all medical facilities in the organization, 
including the Pythagoras Clinic and Pythagoras Pharmacy of the Rajneesh Medical 
Corporation.  In 1980 she became director of the Shree Rajneesh Ashram Health Center 
and quickly became known as the cult’s “Dr. Mengele.”51  K.D. recalled that Puja 
‘delighted in death, poisons, and the idea of carrying out various plots.’  Her fascination 
with the AIDS virus may have actually resulted in one human trial.  In FBI interrogation 
transcripts, K.D. testified that Puja was always very excited about the disease.  She 
questioned medical personnel about culturing the AIDS virus according to evidence 
obtained by law enforcement officials.  Although she purchased a quick-freeze dryer in 
September 1984, it is unlikely she ever successfully cultured AIDS.  Even so, “there are 
unconfirmed reports she may have deliberately infected at least one individual with the 
HIV virus to see if it was possible to transmit the disease.”52 
The Rajneeshee organization and its working relationships between leader and 
senior managers are important.  Table 1 below shows the key players and their alleged 
roles in the organization’s biological weapons program.   
 
  Activity  
Participants Planning Culturing Agent / Spreading BW Agent 
Anugiten X X X 
Ava X ? X 
Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh ?   
Bodhi   X 
Jayanda ?   
Julian X  X 
K.D. X  X 
Parambodhi  X  
Puja X X X 
                                                 
51 Carus uses this as a reference to the notorious Nazi concentration camp doctor to show the depth of 
animosity that her Puja’s behaviors generated among those in the commune. Carus, The Rajneeshees, 121. 
52 Ibid., 126-7. 
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  Activity  
Participants Planning Culturing Agent / Spreading BW Agent 
Savita X   
Sheela X  X 
Su X   
Vidya X   
Yogini X  ? 
Table 1.   “Alleged Participants in Salmonella Contamination Activities.” (From: W. Seth 
Carus, Table 8.1 in The Rajneeshees (1984), 125.) 
 
An organization theory model of terrorist motivations says that bureaucracies contain 
self-interested and competing subunits.53  Internal compartmentalization and competition 
place limits on the organization to coordinate action and make rational decisions.  Over 
time, organizations may lose sight of strategic objectives⎯confusing ends with means 
and pursuing violence merely for violence’s sake⎯as leaders lose both doctrinal and 
tactical control.  The Rajneeshee case perfectly illustrates all of these points.  In sum, a 
cluster of only 14 persons executed a plan of three key players in an organization 
numbering 4,000 members.  The Bhagwan’s vow of silence and hands-off approach gave 
Ma Sheela power to push her agendas.  Ma Puja’s dark side, her technical expertise, and 
special connection with Sheela enabled her to coax the group towards bioterrorism.  
Finally, K.D.’s public relationship with outsiders as mayor of Rajneeshpuram motivated 
him to constrain the others.  Although he actively participated in the attacks, it was K.D. 
who convinced Sheela and Puja to avoid deadly pathogens for fear the cult would be 
immediately suspected.  An examination of the group’s motivations and intentions are 
necessary to better understand their organizational structure, the key players, and their 
influence on the type of attack and agent to be used. 
2. Motivations 
The Rajneeshees had substantial financial resources.  The Bhagwan was known as 
“the rich man’s guru,” because many of his followers were affluent and turned over all 
their assets to the cult.  The group also earned considerable income from the sale of 
                                                 
53 Stern, Terrorist Motivations and Unconventional Weapons, 202-29. 
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books and tapes on the Bhagwan’s teachings.  The most devoted followers were 
“sannyasins,” who dressed only in shades of red and worked 12-hour days chanting songs 
and proclaiming loyalty to the Bhagwan.54  It was on the backs of the sannyasins that the 
Rajneesh built what amounted to a small city.  Their communal system was supported by 
vast infrastructure including a dam and lake, networks of roads, sophisticated water, 
sewage, and transportation systems; and an airstrip on the valley floor for the cult’s five 
jet planes and helicopter.55  The ranch’s 350-million gallon reservoir fed 14 irrigation 
systems.  This supported farms which provided 90 percent of the community’s food.  The 
cult also operated a ten-megawatt power station and fielded a fleet of 85 buses for its 
transportation needs.56  Finally, community amenities included a 2.2-acre meeting hall, a 
160-room hotel, a two-block-long shopping mall, and a casino and disco.57 
The Rajneeshees used the legal system to meet their needs when friendly tactics 
and diplomacy failed.  They were extremely litigious, suing for the smallest provocation 
and flooding courts with cases to steamroll and intimidate opponents.58  Rajneesh 
Investment Corporation teamed with Rajneesh Foundation International to spearhead and 
coordinate legal attacks.  Deputy county clerk Karen LeBreton estimated that 60 percent 
of her work included responding to Rajneeshee legal suits and petitions.59  On the other 
hand, the group disregarded laws that interfered with its objectives.  Sham marriages to 
conceal members brought the cult squarely into conflict with the U.S. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service and U.S. Attorney’s Office in Portland, Oregon.  In addition, the 
group registered as a religion to leverage tax benefits despite years of condemning 
organized religion.60 
In spite of their strange beliefs and often disturbing public displays of sexual 
freedom, some locals tolerated the Rajneeshees because they brought doctors, lawyers, 
                                                 
54 Miller, Engelberg and Broad, Germs, 16. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Zilinskas, Biocriminality and Bioterrorism. 
57 Miller, Engelberg and Broad, Germs, 16. 
58 Carus, The Rajneeshees, 118. 
59 Miller, Engelberg and Broad, Germs, 22. 
60 Carus, The Rajneeshees, 118. 
19 
and engineers to the area.61  Also, their massive spending amounted to a local investment 
of more than $35 million in construction efforts at the ranch since the cult’s arrival.  This 
was a tremendous financial boost to The Dalles since its sole industry, an aluminum 
smelting plant, had shut down two years prior.  There was only one problem with the 
cult’s impressive expansion.  It flew in the face of rural zoning ordnances which applied 
to their property.  The cult built anyway, despite failing to win the favor of Wasco 
County commissioners and securing the necessary permits.  The Rajneeshees soon found 
themselves in a protracted series of political and legal disputes, many of their own 
making.  They had a rational plan to solve all of their problems by fighting politics with 
politics. 
To evade zoning restrictions, the Rajneeshees took over the nearby town of 
Antelope in 1982 along with its school district.62  It was easy to move enough people into 
the small community of 75 and outnumber the existing inhabitants by exploiting 
Oregon’s liberal voter-registration laws.  The cult instituted several measures that 
angered residents after securing electoral control of the town.  These included renaming 
Antelope and its school district “Rajneesh,” and insisting that council meetings begin and 
end with a joke.63  They also turned Antelope’s sole business into a vegetarian health-
food café called Zorba the Buddha.  Infuriated citizens responded with bumper stickers 
saying “BETTER DEAD THAN RED” and “MONEY CAN’T BUY ANTELOPE’S 
HERITAGE.”64  The second stage of their plan was to incorporate the commune at Big 
Muddy ranch into a township called “Rajneeshpuram.”  The new jurisdiction and legal 
status of the municipality conveyed significant benefits.  Now the cult was able to field 
not one, but two authorized police forces⎯one at Rajneesh (Antelope) and one within the 
commune at Rajneeshpuram.  More alarming was the legal access this afforded them to 
state law enforcement and medical assets. 
A select 150 members of the cult began carrying arms to address concerns that the 
FBI might try to kidnap the Bhagwan.  In addition, Rajneeshpuram’s 60-member “Peace 
                                                 
61 Miller, Engelberg and Broad, Germs, 17. 
62 Carus, The Rajneeshees, 118. 
63 Miller, Engelberg and Broad, Germs, 16. 
64 Ibid. 
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Force” was well equipped with military hardware such as Uzi’s and Kalashnikov 
machine guns.65  Oregonians who drove county public roads adjacent to cult property 
complained of being stopped and harassed by the Bhagwan’s police.  His Peace Force 
and other legally armed officers enjoyed access to state-run law enforcement training 
programs and Oregon’s crime data networks.  Fortunately, the FBI denied access to 
sensitive information on its National Crime Information Center database due to ongoing 
federal investigations into civil-rights complaints against the cult.66  Rajneeshpuram 
ultimately became the center of legal disputes between the cult and Oregon’s Attorney 
General David Frohnmeyer, who concluded there was no separation between church and 
state in their jurisdiction.  The community was therefore unconstitutional.  For the 
Rajneeshees, diplomacy had failed and political maneuvering had reached an impasse.  
With time running short and desperation setting in, the cult quickly escalated to violence 
to preserve their community’s sense of autonomy, control, and power.  These motivations 
breed intentions that were aimed at taking political control of the county seat and 
government. 
3. Intentions 
Ma Sheela and the Bhagwan decided to take control of the Wasco County 
Commission by winning the upcoming November 1984 elections.  By some means, 4,000 
members of the commune (many of whom were not U.S. citizens and could not vote) 
needed to take over a county of 20,000 inhabitants including some 15,000 registered 
voters.67  K.D. insisted on voter fraud and three schemes were considered.  First was a 
plan to rent apartments throughout Wasco County and register Rajneeshees under 
multiple names to vote several times during the elections.  Elements of this plan included 
using disguises and absentee ballots to avoid detection.  The risk was considered too 
great and this plan was rejected.  The second proposal involved running a candidate for 
County Commissioner that would support Rajneeshee interests.  This failed when the 
group was unable to secure the required number of signatures to get their candidate on  
 
                                                 
65 Miller, Engelberg and Broad, Germs, 31. 
66 Ibid., 17. 
67 Carus, The Rajneeshees, 122-3. 
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the ballot.  Along these lines, the cult also considered having one of its members, Ma 
Jagruti, run for office under an assumed name.  This was also abandoned when Oregon 
officials learned that Jagruti voted fraudulently in a previous election.68 
Ma Sheela, influenced by Ma Puja, came up with the third idea of making citizens 
sick before the elections so they would be unable to vote.  K.D. told investigators that 
Sheela talked with the Bhagwan about a plot to decrease voter turnout by making people 
sick.69  She played tape recordings to the disciples of her meetings with the cult leader 
when doubts arose that he would support such a plot.  When Sheela asked him what 
should be done to people who opposed the enlightened master’s vision, he responded, “If 
it was necessary to do things to preserve [the Bhagwan’s] vision, then do it… .”70  She 
also echoed his comments that it was best not to hurt people, but if a few died not to 
worry.71 
Finally, a little known and seldom discussed aspect of the poisoning plan was the 
cult’s “Share-A-Home” program.  To augment the BW attack, the Rajneeshees would use 
their vast resources to import and house thousands of homeless.  They would again 
exploit Oregon’s weak voter registration laws by registering and harnessing the votes of 
these people.  County officials outmaneuvered the group, however.  Noting the 
submission of a large number of voter cards shortly before the registration period closed, 
officials insisted that all prospective new voters be questioned by a special panel at the 
town armory.72  The Rajneeshees were forced to abandon the scheme, realizing the 
homeless would not pass the test.  What is more, with an awareness that their town was in 
trouble, Wasco County residents registered in record numbers.  County turnout for the 
November 1984 election was proportionally the largest in Oregon history.73 
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C. NATURE OF ATTACK AND TARGET 
Seldom discussed is that the attacks known as the “salad bar contaminations” or 
“restaurant attacks” were but one of several efforts by the Rajneeshees to gain political 
control.  A series of gradual steps are taken when non-state actors endeavor to use 
biological weapons as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.   “Comparison of State Biological WMD and Terrorist Biological Agent 
Development.” (From: Congressional Research Service Report, Small-scale 
Terrorist Attacks Using Chemical and Biological Agents:  An Assessment 
Framework and Preliminary Comparisons, May 20, 2004, CRS-15.) 
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Acquiring and culturing agent stock seed, laboratory testing on animals, initial field 
testing on the target (whether human, livestock, or crop), larger public trial tests, and final 
operational attacks all represent typical patterns of a developing BW program.  The 
restaurant contaminations were themselves public trials and only a precursor to the final 
planned operational attack on the town’s water supply. 
The first documented use of biological agents by the Rajneeshees occurred on 
August 29, 1984, during a routine fact-finding visit to Rajneeshpuram by three Wasco 
County commissioners.74  The cult gave water laced with salmonella to Judge William 
Hulse and Raymond Matthews, the two commissioners most unfavorable to the group.  
Both became sick and Judge Hulse required hospitalization.  The restaurant attacks 
occurred in two distinct waves in the following month.  The Dalles’ location along 
Interstate 84, a major east-west transportation route 90 miles east of Portland, Oregon, 
produced an environment with more restaurants than normal for a town of its size with 35 
establishments in all.75  Ten restaurants were contaminated with salmonella during the 
cult’s trial runs. 
K.D. and accomplice Ma Ava described their direct participation in the attacks to 
FBI and Oregon state investigators, along with the involvement of Ma Sheela and Ma 
Puja.  By his own admission, K.D. participated after Puja gave him “a plastic bag 
containing a test tube sealed with a cork stopper and filled with a ‘mostly clear’ light 
brown liquid.”76  Puja ordered him to spread the vial at restaurants in town.  “During a 
trip into town to attend a meeting with another cult member, K.D. went to the Portage 
Inn.  Because they arrived after lunchtime, the salad bar was closed, but he poured the 
contents of the vial into the salad dressing.”77  K.D. told officials that Puja wore a wig 
and tainted the salad bar at the Recreation Café.  For her part, Ava contaminated three 
restaurants at Sheela and Puja’s request.  She and cult member Swami Satyam 
Bodhidharma drove to The Dalles with five or six vials of “salsa.”78  According to Ava’s 
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sworn testimony, they poured their vials into coffee creamers at Johnny’s Café and The 
Chuck Wagon restaurants.  They also contaminated blue cheese salad bar dressing at 
Arlo’s restaurant.  Ava said Puja claimed to have put salmonella in “lots of places,” and 
on at least one mission a cult member saw Puja change into a disguise.79  Others were 
also involved in the restaurant attacks.80 
The main objective was a critical infrastructure attack on the town’s water supply.  
Sheela ordered K.D. to acquire maps of The Dalles’ water system.  Ava recalls seeing a 
lot of empty cages in the medical center’s laboratory along with Puja contacting the 
Rajneeshpuram Resource Manager to obtain raw sewage.  Moreover, two other cult 
members named Julian and Anugiten conducted two trials to contaminate the town’s 
water supply. 
According to K.D., Julian described how he and Anugiten climbed up a 
hill to a water tank that overlooked a nearby school. He recalled 
something being mentioned about trying to pry open the screen on the 
water tank and hearing rushing water. …[Ava] was ordered by Savita to 
pick up a car being held at the Portland Airport, clean it inside and out to 
eliminate any fingerprints, and park it at a specified parking spot in 
downtown Portland. Ava later concluded that this car had been used by 
Julian and Anugiten for one of their water-contamination operations.81 
At some point in late September or early October 1984, the Rajneeshees’ 
biological aspirations began to wane and the cult shifted to more conventional tactics.   
Interestingly, the administrative and logistical demands of the “Share-A-Home” program 
played a key role in the group’s decision to abandon the use of biological agents.82  After 
the restaurant contaminations the cult targeted individuals, such as Portland U.S. 
Attorney Charles H. Turner.  Turner was on Sheela’s short list of rivals to be eliminated, 
and the Rajneeshees actually acted on their plans to silence him.  Members traveled to 
Texas to purchase handguns but found it difficult to purchase with out-of-state  
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identification.  They continued to New Mexico, obtained false identification, and bought 
several pistols.  The plan was to assassinate Turner in the garage of a federal building but 
the plot was foiled by law enforcement officials.83 
D. AGENT SELECTION AND ACQUISITION 
Ma Puja considered several agents including ones to cause typhoid fever 
(Salmonella typhi), hepatitis, and even AIDS.84  K.D. insisted on ruling out typhoid and 
hepatitis for fears of them being traced back to the cult.  AIDS was discarded by Puja 
because of its difficulty to culture and weaponize.  Puja’s team also considered putting 
dead rodents into The Dalles’ water supply.  Beavers were preferred because they 
naturally carried bacteria in their bodies called Giardia lamblia or “beaver fever,” but 
they were too big to fit through screens on the town’s water tanks.85  Infected rats and 
mice were also considered.  The agent finally selected was Salmonella enterica serotype 
typhimurium⎯a bacteria strain common in food poisoning.86  Rajneesh Medical 
Corporation (RMC) lab technician Parambodhi provided technical expertise and assisted 
Puja in culturing the salmonella.87  He initially objected saying it was too dangerous, but 
later reluctantly agreed to grow it for Puja. 
The RMC purchased a set of “bactrol disks” from VWR Scientific, a medical 
supply company in Seattle, Washington.88  The salmonella known as American Type 
Culture Collection (ATCC) number 14028 was commonly used in medical settings.  Puja 
and Parambodhi used the disks in the RMC’s state-licensed medical laboratory to culture 
and mass-produce the final weapon.  The RMC had a legal and supposedly legitimate 
need for the substance, because it was a control organism used to meet the requirements 
for quality assurance expected of licensed clinical labs.  Puja and the RMC were required 
by law to test the proficiency of their technicians by having them identify samples  
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contaminated with known agents.  Licensed labs maintain stocks of common pathogens 
for just this purpose.  They also use such organisms to ensure the quality of growth media 
used in their diagnostic testing. 
Because of her position and the RMC’s status, Puja could buy certain 
classifications of agents without suspicion from companies such as VWR Scientific.  She 
even obtained dangerous pathogens from the ATCC, which at the time was a “giant 
private germ bank located first in Maryland and later in Virginia from which doctors, 
clinics, and hospitals order germs for research and standard diagnostic tests.”89  An 
invoice from the ATCC showed the cult ordered and received a variety of pathogens, 
some even deadly such as typhoid fever.  Puja also secured orders for Enterobacter 
cloacae (responsible for various infections including bacteremia, lower respiratory tract 
infections, skin and soft tissue infections, and urinary tract infections),90 Neisseria 
gonorrhoeae (gonorrhea), and Shigella dysenteriae (shigellosis).91 
Large-scale production took place in the “Chinese Laundry” of Rajneeshpuram, 
and was later moved to the Alan Watts complex which consisted of approximately two 
dozen buildings in the northeast section of the commune.92  The actual facility for 
producing the salmonella consisted of two A-frame structures connected by a common 
bathroom.  Ava described a large freeze dryer and “a green incubator the size of a small 
apartment-type refrigerator” containing petri dishes used to grow the bacteria.93  She also 
recalls receiving two large jars filled with liquid containing salmonella salsa.  Cult 
officials identified the site as a germ warfare laboratory during the subsequent criminal 
investigation.94 
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E. SURVEILLANCE AND EPIDEMIOLOGY 
1. Initial Reports 
On September 17, 1984, the Wasco-Sherman Public Health Department received 
its first call from someone complaining of gastroenteritis after eating at a restaurant in 
The Dalles.95  Twenty more illnesses from two more eating establishments followed 
within days.  A pathologist at Mid-Columbia Medical Center identified salmonella from a 
patient’s stool sample less than 48 hours after the outbreak began.  Four days later, state 
public health scientists in Portland analyzed more samples and confirmed the presence of 
Salmonella typhimurium⎯a very unusual strain in this particular case nevertheless 
treatable with antibiotics.  This was considered “speedy scientific sleuthing” since there 
are nearly 2,500 known strains.96  Yet the outbreak would not be attributed to terrorism 
for another year, and then only due to public statements issued by Bhagwan Shree 
Rajneesh. 
Carla Chamberlain, the nurse who ran the county public health office, knew that 
between 1980 and 1983 her department reported only 16 isolates of salmonella.  Of these, 
only eight were Salmonella typhimurium and none resembled this particular strain.97  
County public health officials thought the outbreak was over when the epidemiological 
wave began to crest.  However, the same day state lab technicians identified the exact 
strain in Portland, the county’s public health department received a second wave of 
reports citing ten more restaurants in The Dalles.98  The targeted establishments are 
shown in Table 2 on the following page. 
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                Restaurants 
First Wave (September 11-18, 1984 Arlo’s Restaurant 
 Portage Inn 
Second Wave (September 19-25, 1984 Arctic Circle Restaurant 
 Arlo’s Restaurant 
 Burgerville USA 
 Kopper Kitchen 
 Pietro’s Pizza Restaurant 
 Portage Inn 
 Recreation Café 
 Shakey’s Pizza Parlor 
 Skipper’s Seafood Restaurant 
 Taco Time 
Table 2.   “Restaurant Contaminations Resulting in Illness in The Dalles, Oregon.” (From: 
W. Seth Carus, Table 8.2 in The Rajneeshees (1984), 132.) 
 
On September 25, 1984, in the midst of the second wave, the state sought help from the 
CDC and its Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS).99 
2. First Response 
Mid-Columbia Medical Center’s lab was immediately overwhelmed and “stacked 
high with specimens destined for the state’s laboratory in Portland… .”100  During the 
second outbreak the hospital went through three shipments of specimen media a week, 
instead of its normal one shipment every two or three weeks.  “The twenty petri dishes of 
tests in a normal week mushroomed to two hundred every other day.  At the peak of 
reports, the laboratory ran out of media altogether.”101  Mid-Columbia’s 125 hospital 
beds were filled for the first time ever, with some being kept in the corridors.  Doctors 
struggled to treat panicked and even hostile patients.  “Violent patients and their families 
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demanded their test results; some even threw stool and urine samples at the hospital’s 
doctors and technicians.”102  This disturbing scene which occurred some 22 years ago 
vividly demonstrates the impact BW attacks can have on first responders and the medical 
system.  Had symptoms been more severe or had the agent used been lethal, public 
hysteria and false reporting would have been exponentially worse.  It should also be 
noted that today Mid-Columbia’s capacity has been reduced from 125 hospital beds to 
49.103 
3. Epidemiological Investigation 
A substantial epidemiological investigation was conducted by EIS and the Wasco-
Sherman County Public Health Department.  The team questioned hundreds of patients, 
family members, and friends.  Investigators also interviewed all 325 food handlers who 
worked at the ten restaurants, approximately 100 of which had been infected, and many 
of these falling ill before their patrons.104  They located out-of-state visitors who 
purchased meals with credit cards to ascertain their condition and see what they 
consumed.  Interviews were conducted with 120 people who ordered home delivery, as 
well as those who were served by the restaurants at banquets.  None of these people were 
infected—it was only those who had eaten from salad bars.105 
Two local water systems and the water at restaurants were tested, and salad bar 
temperatures and food-handling practices were scrutinized.106  Investigators visited farms 
that supplied cucumbers, tomatoes, and melons to the restaurants.  They also checked a 
dairy in neighboring Washington State to test cows, cow feces, raw milk, and farm pond 
water.  None of these contained the bacteria.  A common source eluded investigators 
even though every item was traced back to its origin.  The lettuce and other vegetables 
came from different suppliers, and the salad dressings were from different wholesalers.  
The team did find salmonella in the milk of coffee creamers in one café and in the blue 
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cheese dressing of another, but not in the dry mix used to make the dressing.  “This 
suggested that the dressing had been contaminated during or after its preparation.”107 
4. Suspicions and Initial Epidemiological Reports 
Both Carla Chamberlain and Judge Hulse were suspicious of the cult and its 
possible role in the outbreaks.  According to hospital records, Judge Hulse was admitted 
and almost died a year earlier after his commission’s fact-finding visit to Rajneeshpuram.  
In a clandestine mission, Ava slipped salmonella into the judge’s breakfast at Zorba the 
Buddha café in Antelope the morning of his visit to the ranch.108  The cult also gave him 
a tainted glass of water later that day at the ranch while they changed a flat tire on his 
vehicle in the hot sun.  The tire, of course, was surreptitiously flattened by the cult during 
his visit.  Chamberlain’s suspicions resulted from her visit with Puja at the RMC to 
discuss the county’s health reporting requirements and ensure their lab would comply.  
She was astonished to find that Rajneesh facilities were better equipped than that of the 
county.109 
Initial state public health investigator and CDC reports in the fall of 1984 and 
early 1985 concluded the Rajneeshees were not to blame for the outbreaks.110  Laurence 
Foster, the most senior state epidemiologist and widely respected figure in the regional 
medical community, was a staunch civil libertarian who “ardently believed that the 
Rajneeshees were being unfairly harassed because of their strange religious beliefs.”111  
Additionally, Foster was also the mentor of Thomas Török⎯one of the principal EIS 
team members dispatched to The Dalles leading the federal response.  Foster’s 
preliminary report in November 1984 found no evidence supporting intentional 
contamination and concluded it was more likely that food handlers were responsible.  
While Foster did acknowledge finding no common source for infection, he deduced the 
cause “could have occurred where food handlers failed to wash their hands adequately 
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after bowel movements and then touched raw foods.”112  Török’s EIS team concurred 
with these findings in their preliminary report issued January 1985, saying there was “no 
epidemiological evidence” supporting intentional contamination.113 
F. DETECTION AND ATTRIBUTION 
A full year later on September 16, 1985, the Bhagwan went public at the 
completion of his four-year vow of silence.  In a press conference held at the ranch just 
two days after Ma Sheela and her allies resigned their posts and flew to Europe, he 
accused the lot of creating a “fascist regime” that plotted to kill fellow sannyasins, stole 
money, mismanaged commune affairs, and had left the cult some $55 million in debt.114  
More importantly, he publicly accused Sheela of poisoning his personal doctor and 
dentist, the district attorney of neighboring Jefferson County, and of trying to 
contaminate The Dalles’ water system.  The Oregon Attorney General established a joint 
task force between state police and the FBI, obtained search warrants and subpoenas, and 
found the bactrol discs and laboratory equipment at the commune on October 2, 1985.115  
Interestingly, it was about this time when the CDC filed its final report confirming that a 
single strain caused all of the illnesses in The Dalles.116  The potentially deadly 
pathogens such as Salmonella typhi (typhoid fever), Enterobacter cloacae, Neisseria 
gonorrhoeae, and Shigella dysenteriae were never found.  The criminal investigation 
began a year following the attacks, leaving ample time for the Rajneeshees to destroy 
evidence.  However, when the ATCC invoices were eventually seized in the search, they 
were not shared with public health officials who would have immediately recognized 
their significance in light of the criminal investigation.  Public health officials learning of 
the invoices years later considered both the pathogens and timing of their arrivals at the 
RMC laboratory “ominous.”117 
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Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh fled on October 27, 1985, and was arrested when his jet 
landed in Charlotte, North Carolina.118  With him were a few disciples and 21 suitcases 
containing a revolver, $58,522 in multiple currencies, 35 jeweled wristwatches, and 
seven pairs of designer eyeglasses.  Followers had also loaded his throne in the airplane.  
West German police detained Sheela and Puja at a luxurious resort hotel and extradition 
proceedings began.  In the end, only Sheela and Puja were tried in criminal proceedings 
divided between state and federal courts.  The Oregon Attorney General’s Office took the 
poisoning cases of Judge William Hulse and Commissioner Raymond Matthews, while 
the U.S. Attorney’s Office took the restaurant cases.119  On July 22, 1985, both Sheela 
and Puja pled guilty in state court to first-degree assault and conspiracy-assault for the 
poisoning of Judge Hulse.  They also pled guilty to second-degree assault charges for the 
poisoning of Commissioner Matthews.  “In total, Sheela received three concurrent 
twenty-year sentences, was fined $400,000, and was ordered to pay Wasco County 
restitution in the amount of $69,353.31.”120  For her part, Puja was sentenced to serve 
two concurrent 20-year sentences and a concurrent seven-and-a-half year sentence.  The 
state pushed for time to be served in federal penitentiaries and also pursued separate civil 
proceedings against the cult.  Shrewd bargaining by the defense resulted in the women 
serving less than four years in a jail for nonviolent white-collar offenders at Pleasanton, 
California Federal Prison.  Sheela and Puja were released early on good behavior and fled 
once again to Europe before the Justice Department notified the state.  The Bhagwan 
received a ten-year suspended sentence, was fined and paid $400,000, and left the United 
States forever.121 
Besides the reporting bias mentioned earlier, it is difficult to understand why this 
incident was not attributed to an intentional biological attack.  Tensions between the cult 
and local community, combined with the concerns of county public health official Carla 
Chamberlain and Commissioner Judge William Hulse, should have sufficiently 
heightened suspicion.  Between 1979 and 1980 the national survey included 233 strains 
                                                 
118 Miller, Engelberg and Broad, Germs, 31. 
119 Carus, The Rajneeshees, 136. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Miller, Engelberg and Broad, Germs, 32. 
33 
of Salmonella typhimurium with no antibiograms similar to the outbreak strain in The 
Dalles.122  This should also have been a warning.  The double-crest of the 
epidemiological wave illustrated in Figure 2 should have been another anomaly 


















Figure 2.   Rajneeshee Attack Epidemiological Curve. (From: Török et al., Figure 10.1 
in A Large Community Outbreak of Salmonellosis Caused by Intentional 
Contamination of Restaurant Salad Bars, 173.) 
Note:  Days six through eight correspond to September 14-16, 1984.  Days 
13-21 correspond to September 21-29, 1984. 
 
Despite this a 1997 Journal of the American Medical Association article,123 
whose authors include original investigators Laurence Foster and Thomas Török, lists 
nine reasons the intentional contamination hypothesis was rejected: 
• No apparent motive. Despite concerns of potential election fraud, the 
outbreaks in September and October were not obviously related to the 
November elections. 
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• No one claimed responsibility and no demands were issued. If terrorism or 
extortion was a motive, public statements would have been issued to 
create widespread fear. 
• Law enforcement investigators found few questionable activities reported 
from restaurant patrons and could not establish a recognizable pattern of 
unusual behavior. 
• No disgruntled employees were identified, and the criminal investigation 
confirmed that employees did not intentionally contaminate food. 
• Epidemic exposure curves indicated that salad bars were infected multiple 
times during a several-week period, suggesting a sustained source was 
necessary [although an opposite hypothesis could also be concluded]. 
• Some employees had onset of illness before patron exposures. 
• To public health, EIS, and law enforcement knowledge, such an event had 
never happened. “We are aware of only two reports of foodborne illness 
caused by intentional contamination of biological agents, and neither 
incident appeared to be politically motivated.” 
• The alternate hypothesis of intentional contamination, although less 
complicated, appeared less likely based on previously documented 
outbreaks. 
• “Finally, even in thoroughly investigated outbreaks, the source sometimes 
remains occult, and, of all the reasons considered for failing to identify the 
source, this would be the most common.”124 
The benefits of hindsight, especially in today’s post-9/11 environment, make 
these findings appear unsound.  However, the important questions to be asked are: 1) can 
another outbreak like the Rajneesh salad bar contaminations be prevented, and 2) if not, 
what is the best approach to deal with the possibility of covert attacks using unrestricted 
and readily available non-lethal agents?  It is doubtful that regulation and control of 
commercially available pathogens would have prevented this or similar future attacks.  
Cultures such as the one used in The Dalles are easily obtained from clinical isolates or 
raw foods of animal origin in grocery stores.125  Producing and storing large quantities of 
simple bacteria is inexpensive and requires basic equipment and technical skill.  Finally, 
distribution and food handling practices of open societies are inadequate to prevent 
deliberate contamination by determined actors.  This security-freedom tradeoff invites a 
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certain level of unmanageable risk.  Bearing these in mind, the public is best served when 
health care professionals and laboratories communicate and cooperate with local and 
state health departments “to report notifiable disease and unusual disease clusters.”126 
The conclusion of Foster and Török’s report reveals an important finding from the 
Rajneesh case that has implications for BW attribution. 
Routine reporting is essential in disease surveillance at both the local and 
national level, and efforts to improve surveillance will assist in detecting 
future outbreaks in general. The epidemiological approach…need not be 
changed. The methods of determining pathogen, vehicle, and route of 
contamination and relating them to time, place, and person remain the 
same. On the basis of our experience in The Dalles, …if investigation of a 
large cryptic outbreak implicates a mechanism of contamination that does 
not resemble established patterns, then the possibility of intentional 
contamination should be considered, and law enforcement agencies should 
be asked to consider undertaking an independent investigation.127 
The point is that customary “shoe-leather” epidemiological practices are proven and do 
not require change.  However, when these investigative practices do uncover an anomaly, 
then a criminal act should be considered (attribution) and law enforcement should be 
advised. 
G. CASE FINDINGS 
Four distinct findings can be learned.  First, the Rajneeshee attacks demonstrate 
more than any other case the inextricable link between organizational objectives, agent 
selection, and ultimate outcomes.  The cult took a deliberate and procedurally rational 
approach to agent selection.  Key players debated and carefully calculated possible costs 
and benefits of lethal pathogens, eventually deciding on a mild bacterium as the final 
choice.  It was only by luck that the group was not driven by millenarianism or an 
apocalyptic strategic culture, as was Aum Shinrikyo.128  There could easily have been 
751 fatal casualties at The Dalles instead of illnesses.  This supports the thesis 
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methodology⎯that there is a direct link in bioterrorism between nature of attack, agent 
lethality, and detection and attribution (which are themselves a function of surveillance 
and cooperation). 
Second, it demonstrates the failure of nonproliferation regimes, international and 
domestic security protocols, and national defense strategies to detect and deter certain 
types of actors and prevent low-grade BW attacks.  Likewise, it also shows the difficulty 
in discerning signatures of BW acquisition and production⎯especially in the realm of 
non-lethal viruses, bacteria, or toxins⎯whether they be a product of state or non-state 
sponsored programs.  The only signatures may be unusual spikes in human, livestock, or 
crop illness or death during the field testing phases shown in Figure 1 on page 22.  
Legitimate dual-use equipment and sensitive medical materials, the requirements of 
hospital labs, veterinary clinics, and research facilities, and even international trade in 
microbial cultures or ‘germ commerce’ all combine to aggravate an already difficult 
situation.129  The Rajneesh case exemplifies the difficulty in detecting and stopping 
actors bent on acquiring a BW capability.  Put simply, it shows we can not and will not 
prevent all forms of biological terrorism. 
Third, and seldom if ever discussed in scholarly literature, is that the objectives of 
biological attacks will not always be mass casualties.  The Rajneeshee case proves that to 
prepare only for such scenarios invites unacceptable gaps in U.S. biodefense strategy.  In 
fact, both this case and the 2001 U.S. anthrax attacks presented in Chapter III show that 
objectives were not mass casualties.  This is foreboding for critical infrastructure 
protection.  The cult’s unabated success against a localized human population is very 
relevant today with regard to two U.S. sectors⎯agriculture and public health.130  Many 
of the contaminated restaurants in The Dalles never recovered from the poisonings.  Most 
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lost their businesses, while others barely survived by changing names or ownership.131  
Champions of critical infrastructure protection warn of bioterrorism as a tool to wage 
sustained economic warfare.  U.S. agriculture statistics, the potential impacts on citizens 
and the national economy, and existing vulnerabilities all combine to present an alarming 
scenario.132 
Concerning the public health sector, its ability to absorb an attack was challenged 
at both state and local levels by the simple Rajneeshee salad bar contaminations.  Again, 
had the agent used been lethal or a contagious virus, the national public health sector 
could have been severely crippled.  The public health sector is vast and diverse, 
“consisting of state and local health departments, hospitals, health clinics, mental health 
facilities, nursing homes, blood-supply facilities, laboratories, mortuaries, and 
pharmaceutical stockpiles.”133  The ability of this system as a whole and our first 
responders to survive a BW attack, provide continuity of operations, and rebound to 
acceptable and sustainable levels is paramount. 
Finally, this case shows the importance of attribution—a tough lesson learned 
from poor interagency coordination during the criminal investigation which began a full 
year after the attacks.  As mentioned in Chapter I, there are two levels of attribution:  
differentiating between a natural outbreak and a malicious attack, and then actually 
tracing back to the perpetrator.  The Rajneeshee case never got past the first stage to even 
attempt the second.  More than any other finding, this one underscores the need for 
effective communication and coordination between intelligence, public health, and law 
enforcement officials.  Their relationship during the epidemiological investigation in 
1984 and subsequent criminal investigation in 1985 was described as “rocky” and “a 
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clash of cultures.”134  Information was not shared and opportunities were missed.  The 
lines between natural outbreak and intentional contamination were blurred, and it proved 
difficult to establish that a crime had been committed.135   
The Rajneeshee cult biological attacks were the first to show the vulnerability of 
civilian populations to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear terrorism.136  
Likewise, it forever changed U.S. perspectives regarding bioterrorism.  It would seem 
this event should prompt “a realistic threat assessment based on solid empirical data,” and 
motivate policymakers to design “prudent and cost-effective programs for preventing or 
mitigating future incidents.”137  As will be seen in the next chapter, the 2001 U.S. anthrax 
attacks some 17 years later confirmed that such would not be the case. 
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III. THE U.S. ANTHRAX ATTACKS 
I do not believe science will identify the laboratory or country from which 
the present anthrax spores are derived. The quality of the product 
contained in the letter to Senator Daschle was better than that found in the 
Soviet, U.S., or Iraqi BW program, certainly in terms of the purity and 
concentration of spore particles.138 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The first anthrax-laced letters were postmarked and processed through the U.S. 
Postal Service (USPS) on September 18, 2001.  The superior quality of the spores 
suggested bioterrorism had reached “a new level previously viewed by many 
analysts…as possible, but unlikely.”139  Widespread debate about the origin of the 
material used (state versus non-state source) and weather it was “weaponized” or merely 
pure ensued.  The implications of this debate are important, because the answers shape 
the future bioterrorism threat environment.  In this way the 2001 U.S. anthrax attacks, 
otherwise known as Amerithrax, signaled “a fundamental shift in the nature of the 
biological terrorism threat.”140  This chapter analyzes the events that have spawned new 
legislation, government reorganization, and vast investment in biodefense 
infrastructure.141 
The chapter first summarizes the case.  The stresses on federal interagency 
coordination, the national public health system and laboratory capacity, information 
technology interoperability, and the control of sensitive biological materials are reviewed.  
Nature of attack and target selection are considered next.  The incident shows how overt 
strikes, while more quickly detected and attributed to terrorism, still pose significant 
                                                 
138 Richard Spertzel testimony before the Committee on International Relations, Russia, Iraq, and 
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national security challenges.  This case illustrates that the second tier of attribution—
linking attacks to a specific perpetrator—can be problematic and lengthy, if not doubtful.  
The agent and debate surrounding its origin and composition are also studied.  Finally, 
the surveillance/epidemiology and detection/attribution thesis elements are considered 
with regard to the anthrax case.  The conclusion shows four distinct findings that can be 
learned and applied to strengthen U.S. biodefense strategy. 
B. CASE SUMMARY 
The release of Bacillus anthracis during September through November 2001 
resulted in 11 inhalational illnesses and five deaths, and the perpetrator(s) remain at large 
today.142  Twenty-three people were infected altogether and 62 facilities were 
contaminated in eight states.  Aside from the obvious human toll, the attacks resulted in 
significant direct and indirect costs by way of decontamination efforts, unrealized future 
earnings, lost productivity, increased security measures, and government reorganization.  
The timeline of events, synopsis of contaminated facilities, and listing of the medical 
cases are provided in the subsequent Figures and Table. 
 
Figure 3.   2001 Anthrax Timeline. (From: Toward a National Biodefense Strategy: 
Challenges and Opportunities. Washington, D.C: Center for 
Counterproliferation Research, 2003, 10, 
http://www.ndu.edu/centercounter/CCR%202003.pdf (accessed December 
20, 2005).) 
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Figure 4.   2001 Anthrax Contaminated Facilities. (From: Observations and Lessons 
Learned from Anthrax Response: National Response Team Interim Report 
[Draft]―October to November, 2001, 3, 
http://www.nrt.org/production/NRT/NRTWeb.nsf/AllAttachmentsByTitle/A
-80anthrax/$File/ANTHRAX_Report_07_13_04.pdf?OpenElement 




Case Age Gender Onset Date Location Type Status Source Disp. DOD 
1 30 F 09/22/01 NYC Cutaneous Suspected Sept. 18 letter Alive  
2 38 F 09/25/01 NYC Cutaneous Confirmed Sept. 18 letter Alive  
3 39 M 09/26/01 NJ Cutaneous Suspected Sept. 18 letter Alive  
4 45 F 09/28/01* NJ Cutaneous Confirmed Sept. 18 letter Alive  
5 63 M 09/30/01* FL Inhalational Confirmed Unfound mail Dead 10/05/01 
6 23 F 09/28/01 NYC Cutaneous Suspected Sept. 18 letter Alive  
7 73 M 09/28/01 FL Inhalational Confirmed Unfound mail Alive  
8 0.6 M 09/29/01 NYC Cutaneous Confirmed Sept. 18 letter Alive  
9 27 F 10/01/01 NYC Cutaneous Confirmed Unfound mail Alive  
10 54 M 10/13/01 NJ Cutaneous Removed Oct. 9 letter Alive  
11 56 F 10/14/01 NJ Inhalational Confirmed Oct. 9 letter Alive  
12 35 M 10/14/01 NJ Cutaneous Confirmed Oct. 9 letter Alive  
13 43 F 10/15/01 NJ Inhalational Confirmed Oct. 9 letter Alive  
14 56 M 10/16/01 DC Inhalational Confirmed Oct. 9 letter Alive  
15 55 M 10/16/01 DC Inhalational Confirmed Oct. 9 letter Dead 10/21/01 
16 47 M 10/16/01 DC Inhalational Confirmed Oct. 9 letter Dead 10/22/01 
17 56 M 10/16/01 DC Inhalational Confirmed Oct. 9 letter Alive  
18 51 F 10/17/01 NJ Cutaneous Confirmed Oct. 9 letter Alive  
19 34 M 10/19/01 NYC Cutaneous Suspected Sept. 18 letter Alive  
20 59 M 10/22/01 DC Inhalational Confirmed Oct. 9 letter Alive  
21 38 M 10/23/01 NYC Cutaneous Confirmed Sept. 18 letter Alive  
22 61 F 10/25/01 NYC Inhalational Confirmed Unknown Dead 10/31/01 
23 94 F 11/14/01 CT Inhalational Confirmed Oct. 9 letter Dead 11/21/01 
Add ? M 3/1/02 TX Cutaneous Confirmed Env. specimen Alive   
* Originally estimated as 9/27 (case 4), and 9/27 (case 5) from media accounts but then later reported by CDC as
9/28 (case 4), and 9/30 (case 5). CDC = Center for Disease Control and Prevention; MMWR = Morbidity and 
Mortality Weekly Report; Age = years at last birthday; gender: M = males, F = female; onset date: onset of date of 
Anthrax signs and symptoms; location: NYC = New York City, NJ = New Jersey, FL = Florida, DC = Washington 
DC; type: cutaneous Anthrax and inhalational Anthrax; status: confirmed or suspected Anthrax (CDC definition); 
source: probable letter (postmarked date); disp.: disposition alive or dead; DOD: date of death; add: addenda, not 
part of original outbreak. 
Table 3.   The “Amerithrax” Medical Cases. (From: UCLA Department of Epidemiology, 
School of Public Health, 
http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/detect/antdetect_list.html (accessed March 1, 
2006).) 
43 
The operational environment differed significantly from the 1984 Rajneeshee cult 
episode.  First, the attacks occurred within days of the September 11th terrorist attacks 
and the nation was already in a heightened state of alert.  Second, the anthrax attacks 
were overt.  While no person or group claimed responsibility, the threatening letters made 
clear the event was not a naturally occurring outbreak from livestock or other natural 
source.  Last, the weapon used was a high-priority Category A agent as defined by the 
CDC.143  Unlike the Category B salmonella used by the Rajneeshees, anthrax can result 
in high mortality rates with the potential for major public health impact, can cause 
widespread panic and social disruption, and can require special public health actions.144  
Moreover, anthrax is highly stable in the environment making denial of area use, render 
safe, and clean up requirements arduous and costly. 
While the attacks served as a wake-up call to American citizens and policymakers 
alike, a detailed review shows the United States was far from having a comprehensive 
national biodefense strategy in place despite reasonable attempts to improve preparedness 
after the Rajneeshee event in 1984.  The United States Government Interagency Domestic 
Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN) was published January 2001, just 
months before the attacks.  The purpose of the plan was to ensure that Presidential 
Decision Directives 39 and 62 would be implemented in a coordinated manner.145  
Policymakers were beginning to acknowledge the threat of WMD terrorism, but when the 
first anthrax index case hit on 4 October, procedures such as the CONPLAN had not been 
fully implemented or exercised.  A significant amount of on-the-job learning by senior 
government officials, public health personnel, and law enforcement officers ensued. 
CDC procedures leading up to the attacks were reviewed.  Initially, the United 
States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease (USAMRIID) forensic 
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145 The CONPLAN was the first concerted national effort to provide guidance on how the federal 
government would respond to terrorist threats or incidents occurring in the United States, particularly ones 
involving WMD. It was developed through the efforts of six primary federal departments and agencies, 
“consistent with…federal law, the Attorney General’s Critical Incident Response Plan…and the Federal 
Response Plan and its Terrorism Incident Annex.” United States Government, CONPLAN: United States 
Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (Washington, D.C.: United 
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analysis revealed that the strain used in the attacks was one mostly used by the U.S. 
military and its trusted contractors.146  This raised questions about the effectiveness of 
CDC oversight of the Select Agent Transfer Program.  With the proliferation of WMD, 
the rise of terrorism, and the identification of over 30 new lethal pathogens in the past 20 
years, Congress enacted legislation to keep tighter controls on the management of 
biological agents and toxins within the United States.147  An amendment to the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 required the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) to regulate control.  The CDC’s Laboratory 
Registration/Select Agent Transfer Program was to safeguard and maintain positive 
control of 42 designated bacteria, viruses, and toxins.  A November 2002 GAO report 
found the CDC’s oversight left room for improvement.148 
Although the public health system had been preparing for biological attacks since 
the Rajneeshees, several diagnostic and medical treatment limitations emerged.  The high 
demands for sample testing met with only modest capability.149  The Department of 
Defense (DoD) provided operational support through USAMRIID.  Originally designed 
to only assist with ten samples a month during an emergency, USAMRIID received more 
than 700 samples in a single day during the anthrax investigation, and surged to process 
more than 14,000 specimens between September 2001 and January 2002.150 
Other findings were that improvements in information technology could have 
strengthened the ability of federal agencies to respond to public health emergencies.  The 
GAO found six key federal agencies involved in bioterrorism preparedness and response.  
Among these, they identified 70 systems in several information technology categories 
associated with public health emergency support.151  The main areas included detection, 
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surveillance, communication, and support technologies.  The report found interoperability 
to be a serious problem.  During the outbreak, Senator Fred Thompson said, “The good 
news is that there are many agencies working on all of these issues.  The bad news is that 
there are many federal agencies working on all these issues.”152 
U.S. consequence management of Amerithrax exposes the nation’s level of 
preparedness for biodefense.  The impact would have been greatly magnified had the 
crisis not occurred when it did, and if it had not been overt in nature.  Following the 
September 11th attacks America was more alert to the possibility of terrorist acts.  
Moreover, it would have taken longer to detect and attribute the event had the attacks 
been covert.  Even so, the shortcomings of federal jurisdiction and public health and law 
enforcement integration—from who was in charge, to protecting the chain of evidence, to 
attribution—were all critically exposed as a result of the U.S. anthrax attacks.153  These 
deficiencies may have contributed to why the perpetrator(s) remain unidentified and at 
large today. 
C. NATURE OF ATTACK AND TARGET 
The anthrax attacks were overt.  Regardless of the actor(s), their intent, or the lack 
of any claimed responsibility, the written message broadcasting the assault made the 
situation clear.  Four letters were recovered, although some believe as many as seven may 
have been mailed.154  The FBI believes they were sent in two distinct waves.  The first 
wave was postmarked 18 September and may have included one to America Media, Inc. 
(AMI) in Florida (not recovered), one to The New York Post (recovered), one to NBC 
(recovered), one to CBS (not recovered), and one to ABC (not recovered) in New York.  
The second wave was postmarked 9 October and consisted of the Senators Tom Daschle 
and Patrick Leahy letters, both of which were recovered.155  All were originally believed 
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to contain one of the variants of the Ames strain, and the quality of the samples varied.  
While some were crude, the spores in the letters sent to Senators Daschle and Leahy were 
under five microns in diameter and were also of extremely high concentration and 
purity.156 
Fortunately, it appears the distribution was not intended to produce mass 
casualties, but rather to send a signal of sorts.  Georgia State University professor and 
terrorism expert Jack Williams said, “I think this is a distraction, a form of disruption.  
They know us pretty well, how we will react, …and if Osama bin Laden is involved, it is 
part of an overall, long-haul approach.”157  Former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
counterterrorism official Vincent Cannistraro explained, “It just doesn’t have the 
fingerprints or the pattern of a bin Laden operation.  Al Qaeda wants to inflict mass 
casualties and kill as many people as they can.  Sending individual, targeted mailings is 
not going to accomplish that…”158 
While it is difficult to know for sure, it is noteworthy that the first letters were all 
sent to journalists and media outlets.  This suggests a desire to maximize public exposure 
of the event and incite widespread panic. Also noteworthy is that this batch contained the 
less potent material.  The second wave, containing the more refined and deadly spores, 
were sent to leaders of U.S. government.  An objective here may have been to 
demonstrate the U.S. government’s inability to protect itself, let alone the American 
public.  Senator Michael Crapo said the Daschle letter was essentially an assassination 
attempt on a government leader.  “There’s no other way to put it:  It’s an attack on the 
government.”159  Regardless, experts believe the direct mailings versus a public aerosol 
release or other mass delivery method indicate the goal was not mass casualties.  Former 
Soviet bioweapons engineer Dr. Kenneth Alibek concluded “…it was not an actual  
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biological weapon attack, it was a psychological economic attack using biological 
agents.”160  The objectives were to create a national panic and marginalize the 
government’s ability to protect its citizens. 
The mechanics of USPS processing machines, however, did cause exposure to 
postal workers as well as cross-contamination of mail.  The Daschle letter contaminated 
the Brentwood processing facility.  Law enforcement officials found that the letter left “a 
trail of spores as it passed through automated, high-speed mail sorting equipment, and 
tests consistently found spores along the precise path taken by the Daschle letter…”161  It 
is uncertain whether this was an intended consequence.  Nineteen buildings or facilities in 
the Washington, D.C. area possessed levels of contamination described as “medically 
insignificant and too small to lead to human infection.”162  All Senate and House 
buildings were closed for assessment, and the House adjourned for the week while the 
Senate remained defiantly in session.163  The Hart Office Building remained quarantined 
for months until decontaminated. 
D. AGENT CONTROVERSY 
1. Anthrax and Its Potential Impact 
Bacillus anthracis is a bacterium that forms spores—a cell that is dormant but 
may come to life under the right conditions.  It may present in one of three forms:  on the 
skin (cutaneous), in the lungs (inhalation), or in the digestive system (gastrointestinal).164  
An aerosol dissemination is the most effective way to inflict casualties.  From the 
perspective of biological warfare, a cloud or “line” of anthrax laid from an aerial vehicle 
“should consist of particles of one to five microns (one-millionth of a meter) in size.”165  
The upper respiratory track removes larger particles and prevents them from penetrating 
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the lungs.  Particles larger than five microns settle from the atmosphere too quickly to be 
effective.  Particles smaller than one micron are breathed out and do not persist in the 
lungs.166 
Aerosol deliveries are of concern because many diseases are most dangerous 
when contracted in this manner.167  For example, when cutaneous anthrax is contracted 
through the skin the case fatality rate is five to 20 percent, although antibiotics are highly 
effective.  In contrast, pulmonary or inhalation anthrax is usually fatal and if not detected 
early there is no useful treatment.168  Theoretically, 100 kg of anthrax spores spread over 
Washington, D.C. could kill one to three million people if disseminated effectively and 
during the right environmental conditions.169  The World Health Organization estimates 
that 50 kg of agent used on a city of one million people would kill 36,000 and 
incapacitate another 54,000 persons.170 
In Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900, 
Seth Carus mentions 33 cases of non-state involvement in the acquisition of biological 
agents.  He points to four different acquisition methods that were used.  These include 
purchase from legitimate suppliers, theft, self-production, and use of natural materials 
contaminated with biological agents.171  “Gaining access to biological agents never 
appears to have been a significant limiting factor.  In fact, acquiring biological agents has 
usually proven to be relatively easy.”172  If this is true, then it opens the door and adds 
weight to the argument of a non-state connection to the 2001 anthrax attacks. 
2. State versus Non-State Connection 
Widespread debate focused on the exact characteristics of the pathogen used.  
Disagreement began within days of the attack and continues today some five years later.  
The composition of the agent is important, because its level of sophistication can point to 
                                                 
166 Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes, 17-18. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid. 
169 From the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment report, Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks. Ibid., 17. 
170 Ibid., 18. 
171 Ibid., 13-15. 
172 Ibid., 13. 
49 
either state-sponsorship or possibly a non-state actor source.  Initial suspicion focused on 
a state actor such as Iraq, or the sub-national terror group Al Qaeda, especially since the 
letters were posted one week to the day following the September 11th attacks.173  Richard 
Butler, former Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) said the 
anthrax sent to Senator Daschle’s office was very potent and small in particle size.  Four 
weeks into the crisis he was convinced that the agent did not come from amateurs.  “The 
two candidates for immediate investigation, I think would be Iraq and Russia…,” he 
said.174  Richard Spertzel, consultant and former chief UNSCOM biological weapons 
inspector commented on the quality of the anthrax sent to Senator Daschle’s office 
saying, “It tells me that this is no homegrown terrorist.  This indicates a foreign source of 
knowledge at least.”175  A myriad of others would disagree with these initial claims. 
On 8 October, just three weeks after the initial wave of letters, Dr. D.A. 
Henderson of the Johns Hopkins University Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies said, 
“It is certainly not an engineered strain, not a strain like the Russians produced and wrote 
about.  They said they had produced an antibiotic resistant strain.”176  Dr. Scott 
Lillibridge, Special Assistant to the HHS Secretary for Bioterrorism noted the initial 
Florida strain was sensitive to penicillin and a variety of other drugs.  “This is not the 
hallmark of an engineered bio-weapon,” he explained.177  More doubts about state 
involvement surfaced the following week.  Major General John Parker of the U.S. Army 
Medical Research and Material Command said the anthrax tested from the Daschle letter 
was pure, but represented a common variety not genetically engineered.  CDC 
spokesperson Lisa Swenarski stated it was a natural strain responsive to all antibiotics 
available to treat anthrax.  USAMRIID spokesperson Caree Vander Linden explained, 
“There is no evidence that this is engineered to be more potent that [sic] the naturally 
occurring form of anthrax.”178  Finally, on 18 October Senator Rick Santorum tried to  
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calm public fears by saying, “My understanding is that this strain of anthrax…responded 
to every antibiotic used against it, even 1943 penicillin.  Everyone needs to understand 
that this is a threat we have a response for.”179 
The most convincing arguments against a state-sponsored link come from Dr. 
Kanatjan Alibekov (Kenneth Alibek), the former first Deputy Director of Biopreparat in 
the Soviet Union.180  On 5 December and before the Committee on International 
Relations, Dr. Alibek presented his argument why the anthrax was not the product of a 
state biological weapons program: 
Talking about anthrax, I know something about this powder sent to 
different locations. …my first conclusion is that I am convinced this agent 
and this product cannot be considered as a Russian or an American 
weapon. … What I haven’t seen is the fine particle size. Yes, some of this 
formulation was in fine particle size. But there are many particles which 
were a larger size. My analysis shows that this product was not obtained 
using either American or Russian production techniques.181 
He elaborated on the wide distribution of particles size.  Some were very small, on the 
order of one, two, three, five, and ten microns in diameter, while others were larger 
measuring up to 35 or 50 microns.182  Electron microscopy was used to examine particle 
form to see if a highly technical milling process was applied.  Alibek claimed he did not 
see evidence of such a process.183  His third point was that the sophistication level of the 
batches were different.  The first product was not superior and contained vegetative cells 
or immature spores, whereas the later material was higher quality and much more pure.  
To Alibek, this showed learning in the process of manufacturing—a certain sign of non-
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state involvement.184  U.S. Surgeon General David Satcher supported Dr. Alibek and 
others’ claims of a non-state sponsored source.  Commenting on the strains from Florida, 
New York, and Washington, D.C., Satcher said the bacteria was not produced in a 
“weaponized” form.185  Thirty-one genetic markers matched in the anthrax from these 
different locations, meaning they were from the same stock material.  The particles were 
of different size, but the underlying strain was the same.  Satcher, like many others, held 
it to be a “naturally occurring” strain.186 
Debate also centered on whether the anthrax was the Ames strain.  Ames became 
available in U.S. biodefense programs in the early 1980s, and was the standard used to 
develop new vaccines because of its potency.  On 10 October, The Miami Herald 
reported that investigators linked the agent used to anthrax harvested in Iowa in the 
1950s.187  Later that evening, an NBC News report implied the FBI thought it was stolen 
from a Department of Energy laboratory in Ames, Iowa.188  Nonetheless, Dr. Martin 
Hugh-Jones of Louisiana State University insisted, “It’s not the Ames strain, far from 
it.”189  Richard Spertzel echoed this view saying it was not an identical match to the 
Ames strain.190  However, on 13 October Newsday reported that a team of 
microbiologists from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory tested the Florida sample.  
The scientists found that despite previous denials from health officials, it was indeed the 
Ames strain developed in the 1950s.191  Five to 20 laboratories in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and probably Israel have possessed or worked with Ames.  As 
a result, efforts were taken to identify the different genomes linked to its use in these 
laboratories.192  Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah was a major production facility in the 
U.S. biodefense program.  Dugway also produced dry powder versions and weapons-
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grade anthrax.  It is known that at least one U.S. contractor for the CIA worked with the 
strain, but “allegedly had made no dry powder.”193  Most scientific experts and 
investigators today believe the Ames strain was used in the attacks. 
Recently on September 25, 2006, the FBI extended its search of suspects to 
include those not connected or having access to the defense establishment.194  FBI 
Hazardous Materials Response Unit scientist Douglas Beecher said, “A widely circulated 
misconception is that the spores were produced using additives and sophisticated 
engineering supposedly akin to military weapons production.”195  Whoever produced the 
anthrax achieved extraordinary purity and quality (up to a trillion spores per gram), but 
used none of the techniques known to military BW scientists.196  “It wasn't weaponized.  
It was just nicely cleaned up,” said one scientist who spoke anonymously because of the 
ongoing investigation.  “Whoever did it was proud of their biology.  They grew the 
spores, spun them down, cleaned up the debris.  But there were no additives.”197 
3. “Weaponized” versus “Pure” 
The difference between a weaponized and pure agent deserves mention.  Even 
today as back then, the two terms are often misused as one in the same.  On 17 October, 
HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson claimed the anthrax was weapons grade during a 
congressional hearing.  He said it was pure, requiring the significant resources of a 
country, but later added that “a well-financed terrorist group” could also have sufficient 
resources to do the job.198  Later on 23 October, Representative Richard Gephardt 
described the agent as “weapons grade” because of its sophisticated small particle size 
and ability to aerosolize.199  However, where biological weapons are concerned, purity 
alone does not necessarily mean weaponization. 
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The literature points to a weaponized agent as meaning one traditionally 
engineered by state programs.  Dr. Kenneth Alibek and UNSCOM inspector Richard 
Spertzel would characterize these as pathogens that have not only been milled to fine 
particle size, but that also have special additives or coatings applied to resist antibiotics or 
other medical countermeasures.  These are the subtle signatures of true weaponization, 
which traditionally have been the exclusive realm of a select few states.  Nevertheless, it 
also stands to reason that any pathogen altered from its natural form for the purposes of 
causing illness or death would also be considered a weapon in the traditional sense. 
Whether weaponized or pure, the real question is does it matter regarding the 
needs of a comprehensive national biodefense policy.  Findings from the Rajneesh case 
presented earlier, and the surveillance and cooperation limitations that hamper detection 
and attribution capabilities presented in the next chapter, prove that it does not matter.  
Whether weaponized or pure, whether salmonella or anthrax, and whether covert or 
overt, a comprehensive national biodefense policy requires looking beyond these debates. 
E. SURVEILLANCE AND EPIDEMIOLOGY 
Pulmonary anthrax is extremely rare in the United States.  The replacement of 
goat hair with synthetic substitute fibers all but eliminated the primary source of 
exposures.  Prior to the attacks, there were only 18 reported cases of inhalational anthrax 
between 1900 and 1978, and none from then until 2001.200  On 4 October, Florida 
Department of Health Secretary Dr. John Agwuboni announced that AMI tabloid editor 
Robert Stevens had been diagnosed with pulmonary anthrax.  This was the first such case 
in the United States in 25 years.201  CDC and state health departments immediately 
responded to boost surveillance efforts.  “We have strengthened our surveillance system 
in order to give us any early warning signs of an illness or a cluster of illnesses that 
would suggest exposure to a bioterrorist agent,” explained New York Department of 
Health Commissioner Dr. Neal Cohen.202  Bulletins clarifying the symptoms and  
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treatment for anthrax were faxed to 65,000 doctors in New York, as well as further 
bioterror instructions to first responders and other care providers in accordance with state 
plans.203 
Two of Robert Steven’s coworkers also fell ill and spores were found throughout 
the AMI building.  On 12 October, it was announced that an assistant to Tom Brokaw of 
NBC News had contracted cutaneous anthrax after opening a letter postmarked from 
Florida.204  Days later a personal assistant to Dan Rather of CBS News was also 
diagnosed with cutaneous anthrax after opening a suspicious letter.  Investigators found 
spores at several facilities throughout New York including the second floor mailroom at 
ABC News, the Manhattan office of New York Governor George Pataki, New York City 
Hall, the New York Post, and the USPS Morgan Processing and Distribution Center.  
Spores were also found in mail facilities throughout New Jersey including Trenton, 
Jackson Township, Hamilton Township, Rocky Hill, and Princeton Borough.  Exposure 
of postal workers resulted in two cases of inhalation anthrax and three of the cutaneous 
form.205  By mid-October the crisis had reached Washington, D.C.  A letter was opened 
in the office of Senator Daschle resulting in the evacuation and closure of congressional 
office buildings, as well as stopping almost all federal mail deliveries in the National 
Capital Region.206 
Over a period of eight weeks, the attacks produced 22 confirmed cases and five 
deaths.207  Case number 16 (Table 3, page 42) was Joseph Curseen, a 47-year-old postal 
worker of the Brentwood USPS facility.  On 16 October (day one of onset), he developed 
nausea, abdominal pain, and “flu-like” symptoms, but attributed these to food 
poisoning.208  On 21 October (day six), he reported to work for the night shift with 
worsening symptoms and eventually drove himself to the emergency room at Southern 
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Maryland Hospital Center at 2:00 AM.209  “After treatment with intravenous fluids, 
promethazine, and famotidine his symptoms resolved…  He was discharged to home at 
5:00 AM with a presumptive diagnosis of gastroenteritis and instructions to see his 
primary care physician the following day.”210  The next morning at 4:45 AM his wife 
found him slumped in the bathroom and he was taken to the hospital by ambulance.  Five 
hours after admission on day seven, Mr. Curseen died. 
On the whole, hospital physicians and staffs responded well during the crisis.  Yet 
this victim’s medical case stands out as a failure among successes with regard to 
surveillance.  The widow of Mr. Curseen filed suit against hospital staff for misdiagnosis, 
claiming doctors failed to detect the anthrax during his first visit even though several 
other cases from Brentwood and elsewhere had been linked to the mail.  Charges also 
allege that Curseen told emergency room workers he was employed at Brentwood, and 
that this information also appeared on his charts.  Even so, his blood was not tested and 
he did not receive other measures that could have detected the illness and saved his 
life.211 
On 3 October and only several days into the crisis, HHS Secretary Thompson 
testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor, Health, and Human Services.  
Regarding bioterror response plans, he acknowledged that shortfalls existed with national 
laboratory capacity and the education of our health force concerning the clinical signs of 
BW attacks.212  Former Soviet bioweapon engineer Dr. Kenneth Alibek shared these 
concerns when he said, “We are underprepared.  Most doctors and nurses have never seen 
such cases.  They have no idea how to diagnose these infections.”213  In sum, the U.S. 
anthrax attacks “tragically confirmed the importance of disease surveillance, since the 
speed with which doctors recognized the signs of anthrax infection determined whether 
patients were treated immediately or sent home, only to return later to die.”214  U.S. 
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consequence management of this event highlights the significance of improving domestic 
defenses, especially since “many tools used to address natural disease threats will be 
needed to respond to an intentional attack.”215 
F. DETECTION AND ATTRIBUTION 
1. “Anthrax Happens”216 
Government officials and agency experts moved to abate public fears the same 
day Robert Stevens was diagnosed with the first U.S. case of pulmonary anthrax in 25 
years.217  Secretary Thompson mentioned that Stevens drank from a stream in North 
Carolina while traveling the week prior, and insisted there was no evidence pointing to 
terrorism.  CDC Director Dr. Jeffrey Koplan emphasized that Stevens was an isolated 
case, and urged people not to panic and stockpile or use antibiotics.  The FBI issued 
public statements saying there was no preliminary evidence indicating his illness was 
related to criminal activity.  “The FBI is assisting health officials in searches, but at this 
point investigators are conducting a public health probe, not a criminal investigation,” 
explained FBI spokesperson Judy Orihuela.218  The government position in early October 
was clearly one of calming fears, preventing panic, and resisting the notion of conjecture. 
2. Suspicions Rise 
Authorities in Florida eliminated natural causes as the source of anthrax the same 
day letters were postmarked to Senators Daschle and Leahy in Trenton, New Jersey.219  
Multiple infections of such a rare type in such a short period of time made natural causes 
for the outbreaks seem implausible.  Candid views were reflected in statements such as:  
“Unless this guy was sniffing sheep’s wool for a living, and if it is inhalational anthrax, 
that is enough to raise the alarm;” and “Somebody definitely had to introduce it into the 
office; it couldn’t walk in by itself.”220  Consultant and former UNSCOM inspector 
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Richard Spertzel also said on 9 October, “I do not believe that it was accidental.  …  You 
do not expect to find anthrax floating around the air in buildings in a city or even on a 
farm—it’s not a natural event.”221  Congressman Porter Goss described the agent and its 
implications, noting that the signs of professionalism reflected in its quality point to signs 
of organization.   “We’re dealing with something that was targeted [and] reasoned.  The 
methods were not haphazard…”222  The definitive sign of the anthrax outbreaks being 
attributed to terrorism, however, came from a swift change in public statements by 
Secretary Thompson.  On 12 October he insisted there is “no proof whatsoever” that the 
NBC News exposure was terrorism, saying it was an “unusual occurrence” and asking 
reporters to “…resist the urge to speculate.”223  Just two days later on CNN he said, 
“There’s no question it’s bioterrorism.  It’s a biological agent.  It’s terrorism, it’s a 
crime…  But whether or not it’s connected to al-Qaida, we can’t say conclusively,”224 
3. Challenges of Coordination 
Awareness that infections stemmed from a deliberate act turned what started out 
as a public health response into a law enforcement investigation.  On 10 October, Florida 
U.S. Attorney General Guy Lewis confirmed this by stating “It’s now a criminal 
investigation.”225  Officers interviewed workers of government and academic 
laboratories who may have had access to anthrax.226  Polygraphs were administered and 
homes were searched.  The FBI defends its investigative methods as being systematic and 
thorough.  Yet the agency has been criticized for not consulting proper bioterrorism and 
biotechnology experts until months into the investigation.  “There was a delay of several 
months before the FBI subpoenaed laboratories working with the Ames strain of anthrax, 
requesting samples for testing and comparison.”227  On 9 October Attorney General John 
Ashcroft said, “We are relying on the Centers for Disease Control and health authorities  
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to provide expertise which we do not have.  Very frankly, we are unable to make a 
conclusive statement about the nature of this as either an attack or an occurrence, absent 
more definitive laboratory and other investigative returns.”228 
New forensic methods were developed “to balance legal evidentiary needs against 
scientific and public health requirements.”229  Four letters were recovered by law 
enforcement personnel.230  EPA and FBI criminal investigation hazardous material teams 
searched 280 barrels containing 635 bags of quarantined mail that had been seized as 
evidence.  The final letter was addressed to Senator Leahy.  It was found on 16 
November, approximately two-thirds into the very last bag searched.231 
Dr. Kenneth Alibek’s congressional testimony epitomized the difficulties and 
requirements for interagency coordination to effect attribution of BW attacks.  Whereas 
the Attorney General said law enforcement was relying on the CDC and health experts to 
fill investigative gaps, Dr. Alibek pointed to the need for law enforcement to assist 
scientists. 
Just by analyzing this product, you cannot answer this question [of actor]. 
It would require additional study by some experts from completely 
different fields. Psychology or the FBI probably would be the best sources 
to determine who could make this product.232 
It became immediately clear that the 2001 U.S. anthrax attacks ushered in the need for a 
new level of coordination if attribution was to occur. 
G. CASE FINDINGS 
Four distinct findings can be drawn from this case to strengthen U.S. biodefense 
strategy.  The crisis carried a monumental cost in terms of disruption.233  Several 
congressional office buildings were closed for months following the attacks.  The AMI 
building in Florida and USPS facilities in Washington, D.C., New Jersey, and 
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Connecticut remained closed for more than a year.  The Hart Office Building remained 
quarantined for 96 days.  The EPA estimated it alone had spent $13.3 million on clean up 
for this building, and expected their total costs to rise above $20 million.234  It should be 
noted these figures represent funds from only one federal agency’s budget, for merely 
one building, and from just one BW attack.  This case illustrates the costly long-term 
effects to government and society from a relatively simple one-off attack. 
Second, this case demonstrates that determined actors—whether state-sponsored, 
sub-national, domestic, or lone-wolf—will not relent in their quest to successfully 
produce biological weapons.  They are aptly maneuvering through or around the four 
necessary capabilities mentioned in Chapter I.  Scientific consensus that the agent was 
not “weaponized” in the traditional sense, yet achieved sophistication and exceptional 
purity on par with state BW programs shows that would-be terrorist are gaining ground.  
This brings into question the limitations of nonproliferation and domestic and 
international security protocols to prevent acquisition of sensitive materials.  To prevent 
access, countries and international organizations must first have detailed knowledge of 
who has what—a daunting task considering legal reporting requirements and the 
multitude of government, academic, and private sector laboratories and germ banks with 
pathogens. 
Third, detection of the attacks through medical surveillance proved to be limited.  
In several instances physicians misdiagnosed both cutaneous and pulmonary anthrax.  
The initial Florida cases of Robert Stevens and Ernest Blanco were originally diagnosed 
as pneumonia.235  The Florida Department of Health laboratory did, however, provide 
quick and accurate identification of anthrax.  This was due to technicians who had 
recently completed a Laboratory Response Network (LRN) training course funded with 
bioterrorism response money.236  Another surveillance limitation concerned laboratory 
surge capacity during a BW attack.  Complicating the already heavy demands were an 
enormous number of hoaxes and false alarms following the actual events.  According to 
CDC statistics, its laboratories and that of the LRN tested over 125,000 samples after the 
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first reports of outbreak.  Laboratories were so overwhelmed, they considered creating ad 
hoc triage schemes to prioritize tests.237  The primary lesson for improved detection 
through surveillance was increased education for clinicians and first responders to 
identify signs of bioterrorism, and increased laboratory surge capacity.  However, even 
when these improvements do yield fruit, medical and public health systems must 
interface with law enforcement and other outside agencies in order to help.  A frustrated 
AMI employee summed it this way:  “It took five days to figure out this anthrax was in 
the building.  If this is how quickly you diagnose something like this, we’re in 
trouble.”238 
Last, and more than any other case, Amerithrax provides a glimpse into the future 
of countering bioterrorism, which is robust and reliable attribution. 
A viable strategy and improved tool kit to rapidly and accurately attribute 
bioterror attacks [is needed]. Absent a clear, unambiguous ability to 
determine complicity in bioterror events, the nation’s ability to effectively 
deter future perpetrators is in jeopardy.239 
Implicit in the ‘improved tool kit’ for attribution is the need for improved interagency 
coordination.  They are simply indivisible.  Likewise, Amerithrax marked the beginning 
of special investigative protocols between medical, public health, environmental, and law 
enforcement communities.  It highlighted infrastructure shortfalls that prompted today’s 
biodefense initiatives including Projects BioShield, BioWatch, and BioSense; 
refinements in the Strategic National Stockpile and Laboratory Response Network, and 
creation of the National Biological Analysis and Countermeasures Center. 
The Salmonella contamination of food by the Rajneeshee cult in 1984 and 
response to the anthrax attacks of 2001 are informative case studies.  This is because they 
reveal a relationship of independent variables that influence the likelihood of BW 
detection and attribution.  The first was a covert attack using a non-lethal agent that 
resulted in many victims, while the second was an overt attack using a lethal agent that 
resulted in few casualties.  While the perpetrators of the covert Salmonella attack were 
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caught and imprisoned, the terrorist(s) in the overt anthrax attack remain at large.  These 
relationships form a notional model of biodefense that is considered in Chapter IV.  
Previous U.S. methods to deal with the threat of bioterrorism have focused on 
nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and state actors.  These methods failed to prevent 
both the Rajneeshee and anthrax cases.  Today’s environment requires a capabilities-
based approach independent of the nature of the actor.  The findings from these two cases 
are now compared to current biodefense initiatives.  The resulting gaps will lead to policy 
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IV. TOWARD DETECTION AND ATTRIBUTION 
We ought to assume that there’s been some coordination.240 
The thesis has examined two informative case studies up to this point, and has 
identified limitations that diminish biodefense and overall national preparedness for BW 
attacks.  This chapter synthesizes the findings and makes a case for the primacy of 
detection and attribution.  Rapid detection and attribution capabilities are absolutely 
critical to success.  They are the vital elements of a comprehensive national biodefense 
policy that will increase preparedness for either naturally occurring disease or malicious 
biological attacks. 
The chapter begins by defining detection and attribution in terms of biodefense, 
and is organized in five sections.  First, this chapter compares the Rajneesh and anthrax 
cases to demonstrate a need for these critical capabilities.  Second, it provides a notional 
model of biodefense based on findings from these cases.  Third, this chapter calls for a re-
balancing of national biodefense priorities from current infrastructure expenditures to 
basic organizational improvements in order to bolster detection and attribution.  Fourth, it 
considers current public health limitations and their effect on detection through 
surveillance.  Last, the chapter examines nature of attack, surveillance and epidemiology, 
and the emerging field of forensic epidemiology to better understand how establishing 
collaborative networks can improve interagency cooperation so that attribution can be 
achieved. 
A note about what this chapter does not cover: the response phase or consequence 
management of biological events.  The medical system comprised of for-profit hospitals, 
clinics, and Health Management Organizations is distinctly different and altogether 
separate from the U.S. public health system.241  The ability of the medical system―based 
on business models and just-in-time medical care―to surge and provide adequate                                                  
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services during response to BW attacks are not examined.242  Rather, the emphasis is on 
the U.S. public health system, the elements within it that form limitations, and the overall 
effect on national detection through surveillance.  When response is discussed, it will be 
in relation to what facets of detection and attribution can facilitate the transition to 
effective response. 
Detection occurs when public health officials differentiate between random 
clusters of symptoms and an outbreak.  It is the awareness that symptoms are connected 
in some way to consumption of or exposure to a particular source, or the association of 
patients within a social group or across separate geographical locations.  Detection is the 
moment when physicians, epidemiologists, or public health officials “connect the dots,” 
making the distinction between normal day-to-day illness and a genuine outbreak or 
pandemic. 
Attribution is a higher level of awareness.  It occurs when the outbreak source has 
been identified, and when it is credited to a criminal act or terrorism.  Attribution is, in 
particular, not only the acknowledgement of an outbreak but also the assessment that it is 
not resulting from natural causes.  More than detection, attribution has a significant role 
to play in the future of U.S. national security strategy, as a desirable element is the ability 
to link attacks back to the actor.  From a homeland defense and counterterrorism 
perspective, rapid and reliable BW attribution can appreciably improve U.S. strategic 
position by enabling WMD dissuasion and deterrence.  If it can be known that the United 
States will neutralize and quickly recover from biological attacks, and then identify the 
responsible enemy, then would-be adversaries may be dissuaded from pursuing or 
attempting to acquire a biological capability.  Likewise, those already having one may be 
deterred.  Detection through surveillance and attribution through cooperation are the 
requirements drawn from the lessons learned in the 1984 Rajneesh and 2001 anthrax case 
studies. 
A. CASE COMPARISON 
The covert 1984 attack resulted in many victims, while the overt 2001 attack 
resulted in few casualties.  The first used a moderate-grade Category B agent, while the 
second used a highly sophisticated strain of a lethal Category A agent.  The                                                  
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covert/moderate attack was slow to be detected and almost escaped attribution, while the 
overt/lethal attack was more quickly detected and almost immediately attributed to 
terrorism.  While the perpetrators of the covert salmonella attack were eventually caught 
and imprisoned, the terrorist(s) in the overt anthrax attack remain free. 
Therefore, the Rajneesh and anthrax attacks differ in nature of attack (overt versus 
covert), the lethality of agent used (Category A, B, C), the surveillance and 
epidemiological investigation of events, and the detection and eventual attribution of the 
attacks.  Understanding the relationship between these elements is important, because it 
shows areas that can be improved to increase national preparedness for future biological 
attacks.  The two core areas for improvement as revealed by the case studies are in 
surveillance and interagency cooperation between public health and law enforcement. 
Speed of detection depends on successful medical surveillance.  While this seems 
obvious for concealed attacks such as that conducted by the Rajneeshees, it also proved 
true for the explicit anthrax attacks, as victims were misdiagnosed and sent home after 
initially reporting to the hospital with inhalation symptoms.243  Positive attribution 
depends on cooperation between public health and law enforcement.  While this seems 
obvious from the flawed epidemiological reports and belated criminal investigation in the 
Rajneeshee case, it also proved true in the aftermath of 9/11 and the more obvious 
anthrax attacks.  Despite heightened national concerns, the threatening letters, and the 
very presence of anthrax, government officials from the Department of Justice, FBI, 
HHS, and CDC were initially unconvinced and required each other’s expertise to 
determine if a bioterrorism event had occurred.  Debate over the characteristics of the 
agent used and its connection to either a state or non-state actor underscores this fact. 
Comparing the Rajneesh and anthrax cases shows that both nature of attack and 
agent type play a role in the speed of detecting outbreaks, as well as whether they are 
likely to be attributed to natural causes versus a criminal act.  From this it is further 
shown that surveillance facilitates detection, while cooperation facilitates attribution.  If 
these hold to be true, then the implications are:  1) that covert/moderate attacks should be 
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the more attractive option for bioterrorists if their objective is not mass destruction, 2) 
that such attacks present the greatest challenge for the United States in the future, and 3) 
that improving detection through surveillance and attribution through cooperation is vital 
to mitigate possible future threats.  These implications are examined further in Chapter V 
when considering the future framework of bioterrorism.  
B. NOTIONAL MODEL OF BIODEFENSE 
The implications, then, are that robust detection and attribution capabilities are 
important not only to discern covert/moderate attacks, but are also vital in managing the 
most obvious and deadly attacks as well.  When attacks are overt, such as the anthrax 
letters (presence of agent is announced or credit is taken immediately or shortly after the 
attack), one would expect detection to happen rather quickly.  In cases like this, first-tier 
attribution occurs when the substance is identified and law enforcement confirms that 
terrorist claims are not a hoax (second-tier being actual identification of the perpetrator).  
Cooperation is still required for attribution, even during overt attacks.  This is because 
law enforcement must work with patients, physicians, and public health officials in the 
conduct of criminal investigations, and must also work with scientists to determine the 
validity of evidence. 
Agent type or lethality can also determine both the speed of detection and 
likelihood of attribution.  Common and naturally occurring pathogens and the infections 
they create raise little medical suspicion and are not assumed to be the weapon of choice 
for terrorists.  With regard to detecting an outbreak, salmonella did not raise the same 
level of suspicion as did inhalational anthrax.  The rarity of naturally occurring anthrax 
made it more easily attributed to terrorism, whereas the salmonella outbreak was thought 
to be an accident for more than a year.  Thus, the type of agent used influences the speed 
of detection and chances of attribution. 
Therefore, both the nature of attack and agent type impact detection of infectious 
disease outbreaks, however they are caused.  The implications are that future attacks may 
be overt, covert, deadly, or benign, and that national biodefense preparedness relies on 





Figure 5.   Surveillance facilitates detection. 
Furthermore, nature of attack and agent type also affect the ability to attribute outbreaks 
to an actual attack.  The implication again is that future attacks may run the gamut of 
overt, covert, deadly, or benign, and the U.S. public health system and law enforcement 
agencies must cooperate for attribution to occur. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Interagency cooperation facilitates attribution. 
In sum, medical surveillance facilitates detection (Figure 5), whereas interagency 
cooperation facilitates attribution (Figure 6).  If this is the case, then current U.S. 
biodefense strategy should be examined in light of these findings. 
C. BALANCING NATIONAL PRIORITIES 
Today’s biodefense dollars are being spent on programs that do not necessarily 
improve detection through better surveillance, or attribution through improved 
interagency cooperation.  The bulk of funds are being spent to build new facilities and 
award government contracts to private companies for the development of next-generation 
vaccines to counter advanced biological agents.  The National Biodefense Analysis and 
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this point.244  This approach to improving U.S. biodefense preparedness has been so 
difficult that legislation was recently passed to create the Biomedical Advanced Research 
and Development Authority (BARDA) to oversee and award such contracts, with the 
intent to “facilitate collaboration and promote innovation.”245 
Programs such as Projects BioShield, BioWatch, and BioSense do aim to improve 
national surveillance and response capabilities, but they will only be as successful as the 
stakeholders and collaborative networks that use these systems.246  No amount of pre-
positioned vaccine from BioShield and the Strategic National Stockpile will help if state 
and local officials can not access, control, and distribute the medical countermeasures.  
BioWatch sensors are meaningless if those monitoring do not relay warnings to the 
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December 16, 2005), and Department of Homeland Security, BioWatch: Early Detection, Early Response 
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people who need them most.247  Finally, the BioSense national architecture will only be 
as good as those using the system.  Medical officials, physicians, pharmacies, and many 
others must embrace and use the network.  While these consequence management 
capabilities are important, it also follows that “extraordinary measures are not necessary 
to develop a comprehensive terrorism health surveillance and epidemiologic network.”248 
According to the CDC, successful disease surveillance and epidemiological 
response requires collaboration among partners in Table 4 and the response of actors in 
Table 5 below. 
 
State health departments 
Emergency medical services 
Social service agencies 
Hospitals 




County health departments 
Dispatch/911 
Volunteer organizations 










Law enforcement agencies 
Local health departments 
Public Information Officers 
Department of Agriculture staff 
Emergency Management Directors 
Fire/rescue/EMS 
Hazardous material teams 
Legal counsel 
Managed care representatives 
Environmental Protection Agency staff 
  
Table 5.   Response actors. (From: The Public Health Response, July 2001, 70.) 
In addition, CDC planning guidance says that “well-developed surveillance and 
epidemiological capacity is the foundation on which health departments will detect,  
 
 
                                                 
247 Inconclusive tests prevented the Department of Homeland Security from notifying federal and 
local health agencies that sensors in the Washington, D.C. National Mall had detected tularemia. CDC did 
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Notification to Federal, Local Health Agencies,” 
http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2005/10/5/35653f39-93ee-416f-9540-a8cc79aaf652.html (accessed 
December 20, 2005). 
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evaluate, and design effective responses to terrorism events.”249  Even so, studies 
repeatedly conclude that U.S. capacity for timely detection of outbreaks varies widely, 
and the most difficult ones are fraught with significant delays.250 
Where documentation is available, outbreaks with a delay of 12 days or more 
from onset of illness to discovery are common.251  Outbreak investigations conducted by 
the CDC’s EIS between 1988 and 1999 found that of 1,099 cases, public health 
departments, healthcare providers, and medical practitioners combined reported 66.8 
percent of all cases.252  Reporting was delayed for up to 26 days for six of these 
outbreaks where bioterrorism or intentional contamination was possible.253  More 
recently during the September 2006 U.S. E. Coli spinach outbreak, it took two months for 
an 80-year-old woman’s symptoms to be linked to the outbreak through official 
surveillance reporting methods.254  Finally, delays for emerging infections are even 
greater, with identification taking from weeks to years.  The U.S. capacity for timely 
detection of disease outbreaks varies so widely because there are more than 66 national 
disease detection systems spread among all levels of government and between public and 
private entities.255  Detection results from “the concatenated, cooperative effort of local, 
state, and federal entities.  This capacity is not tightly coordinated, not well described, 
and is ever changing…”256 
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Taken together the delays in detection…make it clear that the National 
Detection System cannot detect outbreaks of disease with the timeliness 
needed for an optimal response to many bioterrorist releases, which are by 
intention selected for maximal speed and impact. Poor sensitivity is an 
issue for the detection of smaller or dispersed bioterrorist releases, or for 
detection of premonitory releases.257 
Sometimes the simpler and less costly fixes are overlooked.  Today there is a need 
to re-balance national biodefense priorities―to ease emphasis on current infrastructure 
programs, and to redirect valuable resources towards rudimentary improvements in 
communication and organizational efficiency.  The next two sections consider today’s top 
three public health limitations and the power of collaborative networks to enhance 
detection through surveillance and attribution through coordination. 
D. DETECTION: SURVEILLANCE AND PUBLIC HEALTH LIMITATIONS 
This section begins by defining detection, epidemiology, and surveillance in terms 
of public health.  This is important for understanding the organization and limitations of 
the U.S. public health system which are presented next.  The section concludes by 
presenting the National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS) as a surveillance 
system which holds promise.  While an achievement, NBIS is incomplete without 
enhancing interagency coordination for BW attribution. 
1. Detection, Epidemiology, and Surveillance Defined in Terms of Public 
Health 
Detection is the act of determining the existence, presence, or characteristics of 
outbreaks that permit response.258  The goals of detection are two-fold.  First is to 
discover the existence of some anomaly, such as an unusual cluster of deaths in people 
who attended a public gathering, and then to verify that it is an outbreak.  Second is to 
characterize the anomaly by isolating the specific agent and identifying the common 
source.  Elements of characterization include determining the presumed route of 
transmission, incubation periods, and host characteristics such as age or coexisting 
illnesses.259  As a subfield of medicine, epidemiology helps characterize anomalies as it 
is concerned with “the study of patterns of disease occurrence in human populations or, 
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even more broadly, the comparison of rates of occurrence of phenomena in various 




Epidemiological Clues That May Signal a Covert BW Attack 
 
• Large number of ill persons with similar disease or syndrome 
• Large number of unexplained disease, syndromes, or deaths 
• Unusual illness in a population 
• Higher morbidity and mortality than expected with a common disease or 
syndrome 
• Failure of a common disease to respond to usual therapy 
• Single case of disease caused by an uncommon agent 
• Multiple unusual or unexplained disease entities coexisting in the same 
patient without other explanation 
• Disease with an unusual geographic or seasonal distribution 
• Multiple atypical presentations of disease agents 
• Similar genetic type among agents isolated from temporally or spatially 
distinct sources 
• Unusual, atypical, genetically engineered, or antiquated strain of agent 
• Endemic disease with unexplained increase in incidence 
• Simultaneous clusters of similar illness in non-contiguous areas, domestic 
or foreign 
• Atypical aerosol, food, or water transmission 
• Ill people presenting near the same time 
• Deaths or illnesses among animals that precedes or accompanies illness or 
death in humans 
• No illness in people not exposed to common ventilation systems, but 
illness among those people in proximity to the systems 
 
Figure 7.   Epidemiological Clues That May Signal a Covert BW Attack. (From: The 
Public Health Response, Exhibit 2, 17.) 
Public health surveillance enables detection, and includes “the routine collection, 
analysis and dissemination of all data that may be relevant for the prevention and control 
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of a public health problem.”261  Two broad goals of surveillance relating to bioterrorism 
preparedness are early detection and enhanced disease tracking during emergency 
response.262  In order to be effective, “surveillance data must be linked to the appropriate 
authorities who will investigate unusual instances…and clusters of illness or death,” and 
must also be linked to emergency response officials at local and state levels.263 
In the field of public health surveillance there are two methods of data collection:  
active and passive.264  In active surveillance people proactively gather data.  An example 
of active surveillance is the United States Influenza Sentinel Physicians Surveillance 
Network, in which select medical practices agree to collect and report information related 
to influenza on a weekly basis.  Passive surveillance is reactive, and relies on a system 
whereby information is gathered and delivered after events unfold.  An example of 
passive surveillance is the reporting of disease in which clinicians, medical practices, and 
laboratories are required to report cases.  The advantage of active over passive 
surveillance is more complete (and potentially timely) data collection.  The disadvantage 
is cost, which can limit the application of active systems to improve overall “timeliness 
and completeness of detection.”265 
It is with knowledge of these terms as they relate to public health (detection, 
epidemiology, and the methods of surveillance) that the composition and limits of the 
U.S. public health system can best be understood. 
2. Composition and limits of the U.S. Public Health System 
The U.S. public health infrastructure works to “decrease the burden of illness and 
injury in populations, rather than individuals.”266  It uses epidemiological investigation, 
laboratory testing, information technology systems, and public and provider education  
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schemes to accomplish its mission, and it relies heavily on an adequate and well-trained 
workforce for success.267  In the United States, this system is comprised of “a wide array 
of governmental and nongovernmental entities,” to include: 
• over 3,000 county and city health departments and local boards of health; 
• 59 state and territorial health departments; 
• tribal health departments; 
• more than 160,000 public and private laboratories; 
• parts of multiple federal departments and agencies; 
• hospitals and other healthcare providers; and 
• volunteer organizations such as the Red Cross.268 
These form the federal, state, tribal, and local resources available to accomplish the 
mission, and they interact with a broad range of other partners to ensure public health.269 
In the context of preparedness, the key functions of the U.S. public health system 
include: 
…disease surveillance to detect outbreaks and to monitor trends; 
specialized laboratory testing to identify bioagents, …epidemiologic 
methods to identify persons at risk and to monitor the effectiveness of 
prevention and treatment measures; knowledge of disease processes in 
populations to determine appropriate responses such as quarantine, 
decontamination or the dissemination of treatment recommendations; and 
coordination with partners to establish effective planning and response.270 
To accomplish these key functions, the system relies on several independent components 
that span all levels of government, as well as the public and private sector.  These 
components are embodied in 1) the public health workforce, 2) the healthcare sector, 3) 
laboratories, and 4) information technology infrastructure.271  The implications for 
bioterrorism preparedness are that a deficiency or failure in any of these components can 
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lead to unsuccessful surveillance and detection of BW attacks.  Additionally, the 
compounded problem of incubation periods and time delays between attack and symptom 
onset present decision problems for public health workers that can prevent a timely 
transition to response. 
Public health responses can range from the collection of more information to 
actual dispatch of treatment task forces.272  “Responses have different costs and different 
expected benefits and can be initiated at any time.  Thus, public health officials face a 
continuous decision problem of whether to initiate one or more potential responses.”273 
 
Figure 8.   The Connection between Detection and Response. (From: Wagner et al., 
The Nation's Current Capacity, 6.) 
The time problem illustrated in Figure 8 above, combined with the fact that the U.S. 
public health system relies most heavily on reactive passive surveillance, results in three 
key limitations.  These limitations are in the form of organizational structure, laboratory 
capacity, and the National Detection System. 
a. Limitation: Organizational Structure 
U.S. disease surveillance capabilities result from “the often voluntary 
cooperation of many public health entities utilizing many information systems.”274  The 
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surveillance architecture is so complex because it contains numerous interrelated 
subsystems operated by vastly different entities to include public and private sector, local, 
state, and federal agencies.275 
There is significant state-to-state variability in the existing public health 
system, and also variability at the local levels. Effectively, each of the 50 
states has its own detection systems since public health surveillance at the 
state and local level is based upon the constitutions, regulations, rules, and 
common law of each state. Some states…have state control of the local 
health districts, some…have home rule with many local health 
departments and some…have a mix of local health departments and 
regional health districts.276 
This variance affects jurisdiction and whether local or state officials will initially perform 
the functions of triage, contact tracing, and case or outbreak investigations.  Some 
uniformity across states does result from voluntary coordination through the Council of 
State and Territorial Epidemiologists regarding sets of reportable diseases.  Another 
voluntary network is the Infections Disease Society of America, which sends aggregate 
reports of illness to the CDC.  However, these are voluntary, and represent only two of 66 
identified surveillance systems in the Unites States.277 
Detection can first occur in reference laboratories sometimes located at 
universities or federal institutions.  “The aggregation of a number of…requests [for tests] 
from different hospitals can be an important tip-off of an outbreak.”278  Regarding the 
national capacity to detect outbreaks, a failure at any level in the system can and will 
delay or entirely eliminate the chance of detection, especially for small outbreaks.  
Success requires “cooperation and funding by local, state, federal, and private 
organizations, all working under a variety of rules and constraints.”279  Two problems 
arise as a result.  First is the problem of heavy reliance on clinical diagnosis and test 
results before public health officials can act.  When early warning is critical, such as in 
bioterrorism, “the current system, even under optimal conditions, would operate with so 
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many built-in delays that opportunities for prophylaxis would be lost.”280  Second is the 
problem of heavy reliance on multiple local jurisdictions to assess outbreaks.  This leads 
to a potential lack of sensitivity in surveillance.  No one jurisdiction may have enough 
medical cases to recognize that an anomaly exists.281 
The public health system faces various barriers to achieving successful 
surveillance and detection of surreptitious BW attacks.  In 1999, the Institute of Medicine 
said that real-time detection of biological agents in the environment is problematic, 
“because of the number of potential agents to be distinguished, the complex nature of the 
agents themselves, the myriad of similar microorganisms that are always present in the 
environment and the impracticality of providing real-time, continuous monitoring.”282  
Since the Rajneesh attacks in 1984, and especially since the anthrax attacks of 2001, 
improvements in the U.S. laboratory system and the National Detection System represent 
two approaches taken to fix these problems.  Unfortunately, limitations remain in these 
two areas. 
b. Limitation: Laboratory Capacity 
The U.S. laboratory system and its capacity for detecting the presence of 
biological agents reside at four levels.283  Level A laboratories are public health 
department and hospital labs with a certified biological safety cabinet as a minimum.  
Level B (core capacity) laboratories are state and local health department labs with 
Biosafety Level (BSL) 2 facilities that incorporate BSL-3 procedures and maintain 
proficiency to “adequately process environmental samples, rule in specific agents, and 
perform confirmatory and antibiotic susceptibility testing.”284  These laboratories can 
contact higher-level labs and forward samples for further study.  Level C (advanced 
capacity) laboratories are BSL-3 facilities with the ability to “perform nucleic acid 
amplification, molecular typing, and toxicity testing.”285  These laboratories can perform 
the duties of Level B labs, as well as provide limited surge capacity when needed.  
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Finally, Level D laboratories “can validate new assays, detect genetic recombinants, 
provide specialized reagents, securely bank isolates, and posses BSL-3 and BSL-4 
biocontainment facilities.”286  The CDC has a Level D laboratory for bioterrorism events 
that affect civilian populations. 
The Laboratory Response Network (LRN) is an association of federal, 
state, and local laboratories that provide coordinated sample collection, transport, testing, 
surge capacity, and training to identify key biological and chemical agents.287  The 
system represents a pyramid of sentinel, reference, and national laboratories.288  Sentinel 
laboratories serve hospitals, clinics, and other first-points-of-contact for victims, and are 
not equipped to handle pathogens likely to be used in BW attacks.  For this reason they 
only perform “recognize/rule out/refer” services.289  Protocol requires the system of over 
25,000 sentinel labs to contact state reference labs when suspecting the presence of BW 
agents.290  Reference facilities comprise more than 100 state and local public health, 
military, international, veterinary, agriculture, food, and water testing laboratories.291  
They provide investigation and/or referral of specimens through confirmation testing.  
Definitive characterization of BW agents through microbial forensic analysis is done in 
national BSL-4 facilities at CDC and USAMRIID. 
The Rajneesh attacks overwhelmed state and local laboratories in Oregon.  
Moreover, the anthrax attacks “challenged the network’s resources and exposed a gap in 
planning for communication of results.”292  Between October and December 2001, the 
LRN processed over 125,000 samples of anthrax directly relating to exposures in seven 
states and the District of Columbia, as well as threat samples from all remaining states.293  
As a result, current LRN initiatives include funding to acquire BSL-3 capability in all 
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states, preparing a timeline for providing at least one epidemiologist for each 
metropolitan area with a population greater than 500,000, and conducting at least one 
exercise annually to test laboratory readiness.294 
c. Limitation: The National Detection System 
The Nation’s Current Capacity for the Early Detection of Public Health 
Threats Including Bioterrorism remains the best source available on America’s ability to 
detect disease.  The research team’s goal was to analyze U.S. capacity to detect major 
biological threats, “both natural and terrorist in origin, new, old and future, as a necessary 
first step to recommending improvements…”295  Because the scope could be quite large, 
research was limited to only significant public health threats to humans occurring solely 
in the United States.  Despite this, the team identified 66 separate detection systems 
which it called the National Detection System, illustrated in Figure 9 on the following 
page.  The graphic is confusing because it represents the voluntary cooperation of 
numerous public health entities, using various information systems, across all levels of 
government.  The surveillance architecture is complex because of interrelated subsystems 
operated by vastly different stakeholders which include public and private sector, local, 
state, and federal agencies.296  While an argument can be made that such a surveillance 
framework increases redundancy and the overall chances of detection, the team of experts 
concluded otherwise: 
Taken together the delays in detection, and to a lesser extent the speed at 
which characterization proceeds, make it clear that the National Detection 
System cannot detect outbreaks of disease with the timeliness needed for 
an optimal response to many bioterrorist releases, which are by intention 
selected for maximal speed and impact.297 
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Figure 9.   The National Detection System (From: Wagner et al., The Nation's Current 
Capacity, Figure 3.1, 25.) 
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If active surveillance is too expensive, and passive surveillance suffers 
from under-reporting, then what options are available to improve the National Detection 
System?  The report used signal detection and decision theories to recommend four 
possible avenues of improvement.  These were to improve the quality of existing signals, 
to add new signals, to improve the algorithm for processing signals, or to optimize the 
detection threshold.298  Of these, the area that is most practical and is being pursued 
today by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is in the area of adding 
signals. 
Signals can be added through both passive and active means.  Passive 
surveillance can be enhanced by removing barriers while at the same time adding 
incentives that encourage reporting.  Systems that persuade direct physician early 
reporting are most beneficial.  Barriers can be removed by making forms available on the 
Internet, and incentives can be provided by giving physicians information about similar 
cases.299  The high costs associated with active surveillance can be reduced by leveraging 
data already collected routinely for other purposes.  This minimizes the cost to develop 
and maintain special purpose data collection systems.  Furthermore, “value-of-
information consideration” is a decision theory principle that can reduce costs further by 
calculating the utility of whether to collect certain kinds of information.300  These 
principles find direct application in today’s National Biosurveillance Integration System. 
3. The National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS) 
NBIS is a government-wide system managed by DHS.  It is intended to “combine 
multiple data streams from sector-specific agencies―those with health, environmental, 
agricultural, and intelligence data―to provide all stakeholders with broad situational 
awareness that is expected to allow for earlier detection of events and to facilitate 
coordinated response.”301  The goal is to “collect, assemble, and analyze a wide range of 
relevant information and make such information available to government stakeholders in 
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a timely and reliable fashion.”302  When operational, NBIS will consolidate information 
in a common platform, and will coalesce this information with environmental and 
intelligence data.  The new surveillance system will be used by DHS analysts to provide a 
common picture for public health surveillance to DHS’s Homeland Security Operations 
Center, and the Interagency Incident Management Group as described in the National 
Response Plan.303 
NBIS was originally intended for bioterrorism, but its officials acknowledge that 
because it is difficult to discern between natural and deliberate outbreaks, it will also be 
useful in providing early warning of naturally occurring outbreaks.304  A central feature 
is software that actively probes or uses data-mining techniques to examine existing 
information sources.  NBIS scans the Internet for reports (and even rumors of events) to 
systematically analyze over 1 million sites each day.  “There is some evidence that this 
software has identified recent outbreaks significantly earlier than other systems have.”305 
NBIS went from the requirements determination phase to the implementation 
phase in December 2004.  While still under development, it aims to be “the ‘eyes and 
ears’ of the nation for indicators and warnings that prompt early detection of a disease 
outbreak, whether natural or deliberate in origin…”306  However, “it is not designed to 
replace existing agencies’ responsibilities for response, risk assessment, or forensic 
attribution.”307  Therefore, even though NBIS appears to be a move in the right direction 
to improve detection through better surveillance, it still does not replace the need for 
interagency cooperation and collaborative networks to realize rapid and reliable 
attribution. 
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E. ATTRIBUTION: COOPERATION AND COLLABORATIVE NETWORKS 
Attribution requires cooperation between the private sector, academia, scientists, 
epidemiologists, physicians, public health officials, and law enforcement agencies.308  
Thesis research, the case studies, and personal exercise participation have all shown that 
the relationship between public health and law enforcement is most vital for achieving 
BW attribution.  This section begins by looking at how these two communities manage 
nature of attack and what specific roles they play in the surveillance and epidemiological 
process.  It will be shown how subtle yet important differences between these two fields 
can hamper attribution.  The section concludes by considering the emerging field of 
forensic epidemiology and revealing existing barriers to interagency coordination. 
1. Managing Nature of Attack 
Both law enforcement and public health officials emphasize the significance of 
attack nature in detecting and attributing bioterrorism.  In testimony before Congress, 
Special Agent in Charge Larry Mefford of the FBI’s San Francisco Division explained 
federal law enforcement’s distinction between overt and covert BW attacks.  If covert, 
the response is driven by the public health community.  Initially there is no crime scene 
to investigate, and the criminal act may not be revealed until several days have 
elapsed.309  Once there is indication of a criminal act using a biological agent, the FBI 
assumes primary authority in conducting the criminal investigation while public health 
agencies retain responsibility for the welfare of citizens. 
Covert attacks create coordination problems at the critical point shown in Figure 
10 on the following page. 
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Figure 10.   Law Enforcement and Public Health Coordination by Nature of Event – 
Covert BW Attack. (From: Collaboration between Public Health and Law 
Enforcement.) 
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Figure 11.   Law Enforcement and Public Health Coordination by Nature of Event – 




If state or local health officials do not identify a threat (detection), and then do not 
contact law enforcement officials, outbreaks run the risk of never being attributed to 
terrorism.  Such was the case with the Rajneesh cult, where the covert attacks were not 
attributed for more than a year.  Operational and table-top exercises show time and again 
that state and local public health departments are reluctant to contact federal or local law 
enforcement.310  This is because false calls can be embarrassing, and often there are 
delays for more tests and irrefutable medical evidence before contacting law 
enforcement. 
The position of medical examiner highlights typical coordination challenges.311  
Once under medical auspices to promote better understanding of death and disease, today 
medical examiners fall under the Sheriff’s Department for evidentiary reasons and to 
support criminal proceedings.  This line of authority (and associated loyalties) can vary 
from state to state.  The evolution of this position moving from the public health arena to 
law enforcement has mainly been the result of funding issues over time⎯as hospitals 
have cut back to improve profit margins and as law enforcement has found more utility in 
the position of medical examiner.312  Unfortunately, the delays associated with public 
health’s reluctance to contact law enforcement and the political loyalties of medical 
examiners can be deadly, as it takes three to five days before acute symptoms of 
inhalational anthrax appear.313  While some deaths did occur in the Amerithrax case, the 
overt nature of the letters helped to transcend organizational barriers and facilitate 
quicker detection and attribution. 
The CDC Emerging Infectious Disease article, “Collaboration between Public 
Health and Law Enforcement: New Paradigms and Partnerships for Bioterrorism 
Planning and Response,” stresses why interagency cooperation is so important for 
successful detection and attribution of BW attacks.  Collaboration between the CDC and 
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FBI during the 2001 anthrax attacks highlighted the challenges to public health and law 
enforcement coordination in general.  “Public health and law enforcement agencies 
become involved in the investigation of a possible bioterrorism event under different 
circumstances.  Such events fall into one of two categories: overt and covert.”314  The 
two possible sequence of events are shown in Figures 10 and 11 on pages 84 and 85.  
Before 2001, the collaborative efforts of CDC and FBI in establishing the LRN facilitated 
the coordination shown at the bottom of Figure 10.  The need for validating tests that 
would be consistent with evidentiary requirements resulted in a uniform set of laboratory 
protocols based on established procedures.315  This permitted the introduction of test 
results into a court of law, thereby reducing legal challenges and increasing the chances 
of conviction.316  “The 2001 anthrax incidents demonstrated the importance of the LRN 
in responding to a biological attack and revealed the need to expand its laboratory 
capacities,” so that public health and law enforcement officials can better work towards 
detection and attribution.317 
2. Roles in the Surveillance and Epidemiological Process 
The different and sometimes diametrically opposed goals of public health and law 
enforcement officials makes cooperation between the two difficult, as was revealed in 
both the Rajneesh and anthrax cases.  The University of California Los Angeles 
Department of Epidemiology, School of Public Health, provides an excellent description 
of epidemiology and its distinction from law enforcement.  It says epidemiologists are 
“disease detectives” that use similar methods as regular detectives in determining the 
cause of disease outbreaks, epidemics (a larger excess of disease), or pandemics (a 
worldwide excess of disease).318  While the 2001 anthrax attacks share many of the same 
characteristics as typical outbreaks, the difference was that “there was no transmission 
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from infected to susceptible persons that linked one case to another.”319  Nonetheless, 
deliberately infecting others with a deadly disease is a crime handled by police.  Because 
the anthrax attacks involved more than one state and the USPS, the FBI was assigned 
jurisdictional control.  Yet harm to victims was caused by Bacillus anthracis, calling for 
experienced disease rather than police detectives.  This role was filled by forensic 
microbiologists from USAMRIID and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and 
epidemiologists from the CDC.320 
While both types of detectives use similar methods of investigation, the use of 
their findings is far different.  Law enforcement officials protect their information in 
order to build a case for conviction under the rules of evidence in a court of law.  
Epidemiologists use different methods and have different goals.  They try to figure out 
what went wrong in a social or physical environment by identifying factors that permit 
disease to spread.  Their goal is to identify and then educate medical and healthcare 
professionals “so as to increase understanding of the human situation.”321  Education 
efforts involve the general public, and require the use of media outlets to transmit the 
message.  Police detectives want to review medical records and interview patients, while 
physicians and medical systems want to protect patient records and their rights to privacy.  
Police detectives want to guard information and evidence, while epidemiologists want to 
broadcast and publish information.  “When faced with a bioterrorist, however, police 
detectives and disease detectives share a goal, namely to find and stop the responsible 
terrorist or group of terrorists.”322 
3. Forensic Epidemiology and Existing Barriers to Coordination 
Public health and law enforcement officials have conducted parallel investigations 
since the 1970s.323  However, the anthrax attacks of 2001 and thousands of associated 
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hoaxes have required these agencies to work together in unprecedented ways.324  
Suspicions that the West Nile Virus in the United States could have been a deliberate act 
presented additional challenges for public health and criminal investigators.325  “The 
concurrent responses to such threats affirmed the many similarities in the goals and 
investigative methods used by both law enforcement and public health officials but also 
highlighted salient differences in the different disciplines’ approaches.” 326  
Consequently, a new field emerged called microbial forensics or forensic epidemiology.  
Forensic epidemiology is “the use of epidemiologic and other public health methods in 
conjunction with or as an adjunct to an ongoing criminal investigation.”327  The 
American Academy of Microbiology says “the emerging discipline…combines principles 
of public health epidemiology and law enforcement to identify patterns in a disease 
outbreak, determine the pathogen involved, control its spread and trace the 
microorganism to its source―the perpetrator(s).”328 
In 2002, the CDC’s Public Health Law Program developed a module for the joint 
training of public health and law enforcement officials.  The goal was and is to “foster 
improved understanding of the investigative goals and methods specific to each discipline 
and to strengthen interdisciplinary collaborative effectiveness in response to future 
attacks.”329  The joint training module is a self-contained instructional package that can 
be used in any jurisdiction throughout the United States.330  The CDC’s Course 
Manager’s Guide and the FBI’s Criminal and Epidemiological Investigation Handbook 
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are the two primary deliverables that have resulted from collaborative efforts thus far.331  
This forensic epidemiology course is currently in a national dissemination mode.  As of 
September 2004 it had been taught in 165 training sessions in 42 states and territories.332  
While the growth of this new field and associated training programs are a step towards 
increasing attribution of biological attacks, problems of interagency coordination remain. 
Barriers to coordination have been identified for both public health and law 
enforcement agencies.  During joint workshops, participants noted two barriers for the 
sharing of patient information.333  First is the public health community’s concern that it 
will be held liable for the release of patient information without consent.  Second is the 
apprehension of sharing sensitive patient information with law enforcement based on 
issues of ethics and trust.  Patients sometimes provide very personal information to 
healthcare professionals expecting that it will be safeguarded it in confidence.  Public 
health officials worry that by sharing such information with law enforcement, regardless 
of the situation, it will jeopardize their future ability to perform duties as patients begin to 
withhold information for fear it will be released.  It would damage the “doctor-patient” 
privilege of privacy and violate their professional code of ethics.334 
Two barriers were also noted for the law enforcement community.  First, they are 
reluctant to share information with public health officials because it could “jeopardize the 
safety of confidential informants or the security of classified sources.”335  Public health 
officials understand this dilemma, but nonetheless desire “alerts” when a heightened 
awareness is warranted.  Such alerts would permit public health officials “to be on the 
lookout for unusual or unexplained illnesses, and to monitor what may otherwise initially 
be overlooked as a signal that there has been a biological release.”336  The second 
concern of law enforcement officials is that suspects may avoid capture as a result of 
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sharing investigative information.  Inadvertent leaks back to the suspect are more likely 
the more people that have access to investigative data.  Unintended tip-offs could give 
suspects enough time to either destroy evidence or avoid detection altogether. 
Finally, experts and experience from bioterrorism training exercises reveals other 
barriers to coordination.337  Cindy Lambdin from U.C. Berkeley’s School of Public 
Health, Center for Infectious Disease Preparedness, has observed the same repeated 
mistakes in her more than 20 years of public health service and as an emergency response 
exercise planner.  When asked what the biggest barrier to coordination is between public 
health and law enforcement officials, she responded, “They don’t speak the same 
language.  They lack a common vocabulary.”338  The word “surveillance” was used as an 
example.  To public health officials, surveillance (of infectious disease) means something 
quite different than it does to law enforcement officials (in the course of a criminal 
investigation). 
The research literature does not address organizational cultural and its obstruction 
to the sharing of information between public health and law enforcement agencies.  
Experts like Mrs. Lambdin suggest that public health’s reluctance to notify law 
enforcement about the potential use of biological agents represents a cultural problem 
within the community.339  Public health officials are unwilling to contact law 
enforcement agencies without positive test results.  What is more, often they will wait for 
not one, but two conclusive tests before initiating any coordination.  Unfortunately, 
biology and nature can not be hastened.  Depending on the pathogen, it can literally take 
weeks to culture some tests to determine the presence of certain agents.  Waiting for test 
results exacerbates the time problem from detection to response shown previously in 
Figure 8, page 75.  Experts believe that for the public health community, the fear of 
making a false-positive regarding bioterrorism outweighs the fear of making a either late 
call, or no call at all. 
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Up to this point, key terms have been defined and findings from the case studies 
have been synthesized.  A notional model of biodefense was introduced based on the 
primacy of surveillance facilitating detection, and cooperation facilitating attribution.  A 
call for the re-balancing of national biodefense priorities was supported by revealing 
public health limitations and existing barriers to interagency coordination.  This study 
now concludes by suggesting a future framework of bioterrorism, by considering what 
previous generations of experts proposed as solutions to the same problem, and by 
providing specific recommendations to strengthen U.S. biodefense strategy. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
We need to strengthen things. We need to strengthen our public health 
system, our education, we need to strengthen our laboratory systems. 
…We have gaps. We can, indeed, make our response stronger, and it’s 
imperative that we do so.340 
Detection and attribution of biological events are dependent variables in a 
notional model of biodefense.  Surveillance facilitates detection, while interagency 
cooperation facilitates attribution.  Research of the U.S. public health system found its 
organizational structure, laboratory capacity, and National Detection System to be the top 
three limitations that hinder effective surveillance.  The relationship between public 
health and law enforcement was found to be most vital for achieving attribution.  Study 
of these two communities found that the subtle yet existing differences in the way they 
manage nature of attack, and the distinct roles they play in the surveillance and 
epidemiological processes, serve to encumber cooperation and thus attribution. 
This chapter concludes first by considering the future bioterrorism threat 
environment.  While circuitously related to BW detection and attribution, the case studies 
and thesis research support these findings as being imperative for biodefense 
preparedness and overall national security.  Next, the chapter takes a historical look at 
how previous generations of public health and bioterrorism experts addressed the same 
problems of today.  Finally, these themes are combined with thesis findings to provide 
policy recommendations for improving detection and attribution capabilities, and 
therefore strengthen preparedness and U.S. biodefense strategy. 
A. THE FUTURE FRAMEWORK OF BIOTERRORISM 
Thesis research has revealed that the future bioterrorism threat is different than 
what most literature on the subject portrays.  Therefore, the new challenges facing U.S. 
biodefense and its implications for national preparedness are now considered.  Traditional 
views of infectious disease and national security have focused on military forces and their 
ability to survive BW attacks and sustain combat operations.  However, a paradigm shift 
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has occurred and the emerging link between infectious disease and U.S. national security 
is now recognized.341  Evolving security concepts today acknowledge the potential 
impacts of disease on general population mortality, economic loss, and social and 
government disruption.342  These are key drivers for the orientation of U.S. biodefense 
strategy.  Similarly, the research for this thesis has uncovered new challenges facing U.S. 
biodefense with direct implications for preparedness and national security. 
1. Terrorists Are Managing Capabilities343 
The Rajneesh and anthrax cases demonstrate that terrorists are dealing with the 
requirements of biological weapons in one of two ways.  They are either slowly climbing 
the capabilities curve themselves, or are settling for a substitute capability by attempting 
to acquire the necessary technology, professional skill, and sensitive materials from 
others.  Whether state or non-state actor, successful programs require four distinct 
capabilities.  These are the means to acquire, to produce, to weaponize (if necessary), and 
to effectively deliver a biological weapon.  History shows that organizations make their 
agent selection—even sometimes reconsider their operational objectives—based solely 
on their capabilities in these four areas.  History also shows that some terrorists, cults, 
and apocalyptic groups remain determined to use biological weapons to achieve their 
strategic objectives.  Lastly, recent developments in the ongoing U.S. anthrax 
investigation show that some may have achieved capabilities that before were considered 
unattainable.344 
Even so, the highly technical skills required for milling and aerosolizing 
biological materials while at the same time maintaining a virulent strain can be 
circumvented.  Acquisition of the right material, such as a contagious and highly 
transmittable pathogen with no known cure, completely bypasses the weaponization and 
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delivery problem and can place groups squarely in the mass destruction zone.  Therefore, 
access to advanced biological weapons, certain types of genetically altered DNA, or 
lethal contagious pathogens present serious nonproliferation concerns.  Armed with a 
transmissible weapon, the human, livestock, or plant host becomes the vector.  The 
technical challenges that constrained Aum Shinrikyo, the Rajneeshees and others are 
quickly solved.  More likely than not, the limited amount of advanced material combined 
with strict security protocols will force terrorists towards less lethal and destructive 
agents, driving them down the BW threat curve.  While containing attackers in this 
operating space is a success on the one hand, it poses new challenges for biodefense 
preparedness on the other.  The result is a requirement for quicker detection of 
inconspicuous disease outbreaks. 
2. Mass Effects vs. Mass Destruction 
The term “WMD” is grossly overused, is short-sighted and sometimes misapplied, 
and on the whole represents an old way of thinking.345  The future framework of 
terrorism demands considering and preparing for the full spectrum of possible 
devastating effects.  Persistent materials like radioisotopes or anthrax spores can deny the 
use of territory and compel governments into costly cleanup.  The isotopes need not be 
from highly enriched fissile materials, and the spores need not be from a virulent strain.  
The American public would demand and politicians would be responsible for rendering 
affected areas safe.  Fallout from a dirty bomb or a cloud of anthrax would leave portions 
of metropolitan cities uninhabitable.  The direct costs of decontamination—street by 
street, and building by building—would be astronomical.  The cascading and indirect 
economic effects from lost productivity, failed businesses, and unrealized future earnings 
would be additionally enormous.  The psychological trauma and degradation of public 
confidence in the government to protect citizens would be immeasurable.  Finally, any 
resulting amendments or additions to national law, reorganization or creation of 
governmental agencies, or necessary changes in private or public security practices would 
also represent further intangible costs.  It is not enough to say that such doomsday 
scenarios are just speculation and have not yet happened.  The 1984 Rajneeshee, the 1995 
Aum Shinrikyo, and the 2001 anthrax attacks all were only conjecture before becoming 
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reality.  Interestingly the Rajneesh, and in all probability the U.S. anthrax case, 
convincingly show that attack objectives were not mass destruction or mass casualties. 
Another area of concern is the potential cascading effects of bioterrorism that can 
cripple critical infrastructure.  This is important because agriculture offers another avenue 
for infectious disease to enter human populations via livestock and plant hosts or sources.  
Avian H5N1 influenza through poultry and the recent E. Coli spinach outbreak through 
U.S. produce are examples. 
Accordingly, champions of critical infrastructure protection warn of bioterrorism 
as a tool to wage sustained economic warfare.  U.S. agriculture statistics, the potential 
impacts on citizens and the national economy, and existing vulnerabilities all combine to 
present an alarming picture.346  The August 2006 Congressional Research Service report 
Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness concludes that agroterrorism is a subset of 
bioterrorism, defined as the intentional introduction of animal or plant disease to generate 
fear, cause economic loss, and/or undermine social stability.347  “The goal of 
agroterrorism is not to kill cows or plants.  These are the means to the end of causing 
economic damage, social unrest, and loss of confidence in government”348  The same 
logic applies to the public health sector.  Its ability to absorb an attack was challenged at 
both state and local levels by the simple Rajneeshee salad bar contaminations.  Had the 
agent used been lethal, or worse yet a contagious virus, the national public health sector 
could have been severely crippled.  The health sector is vast and diverse, “consisting of 
state and local health departments, hospitals, health clinics, mental health facilities, 
nursing homes, blood-supply facilities, laboratories, mortuaries, and pharmaceutical 
stockpiles.”349  The ability of this system as a whole and our first responders to survive a 
                                                 
346 U.S. agriculture accounts for one-sixth of national Gross Domestic Product which equates to over 
$1 trillion a year. As a sector, it is the nation’s largest employer with one in eight working directly in food 
production. Exports total $50 billion a year⎯the largest positive contribution to U.S. trade balance. U.S. 
farming is the most efficient in the world, enabling Americans to spend less than 11 percent of disposable 
income on food compared to the global average of 20 to 30 percent. Parker, Agricultural Bioterrorism, x. 
347 Jim Monke, Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress, August 25, 2006), ii, 
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL32521.pdf#search=%22Agroterrorism%3A%20Threats%
20and%20Preparedness%202006%22 (accessed October 5, 2006). 
348 Ibid. 
349 The White House, National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and 
Key Assets, 41. 
97 
BW attack, provide continuity of operations, and rebound to acceptable and sustainable 
levels is paramount.  If future attacks aim to disrupt rather than destruct—to slowly erode 
U.S. economies and social stability—then preparedness entails more sensitive disease 
detection and attribution abilities. 
3. The Limits of Attribution for Dissuasion and Deterrence 
Attribution plays a crucial role in the future of dissuading and deterring WMD 
terrorism, but it is not the mainstay of biodefense preparedness.  The September, 2006 
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism catalogues a six-point plan for denying 
WMD “to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them.”350  A vital element for 
deterrence is being able to define the nature and source of a terrorist-employed WMD 
device. 
Should a WMD terrorist attack occur, the rapid identification of the source 
and perpetrator of an attack will enable our response efforts and may be 
critical in disrupting follow-on attacks. We will develop the capability to 
assign responsibility for the intended or actual use of WMD via accurate 
attribution – the rapid fusion of technical forensic data with intelligence 
and law enforcement information.351 
The words “attribute,” “attribution,” or the concept linking intelligence and law 
enforcement to identify attackers appears nowhere in the previous strategy document 
published February, 2003.  The concept of advertising an attribution capability in order to 
bolster dissuasion and deterrence of WMD terrorism is a necessary step forward.  
However, attribution has limits.  It will not dissuade the determined terrorist, nor deter 
the procedurally rational actor whose objectives may in fact be to create chaos or hasten 
the end of time—groups whose only constituency is God himself, or whose 
organizational survival is of no real concern.  Unfortunately, this lot makes up 75 percent 
of the non-state actors who have actually used chemical or biological weapons in more  
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than 244 attacks in 26 countries since World War I.352  Furthermore, attribution may not 
deter terrorists whose objectives are to provoke a retaliatory response and create regional 
instability. 
This thesis defines attribution as a two-level process.  The first tier is 
differentiating between a natural disease outbreak and a malicious attack.  Outbreaks 
must first be detected and characterized as terrorism.  While this seems obvious in theory, 
history and the case studies show it to be more difficult in practice.  The second tier is 
actually tracing back to the perpetrator—the so called ‘return address’ capability.  In sum, 
the Rajneeshee case never got past the first stage to even attempt the second, and 
underscores the need for effective communication and coordination between intelligence, 
public health, and law enforcement officials.  The first level of attribution relies more 
heavily on organizational theory than science, is well within our national capabilities, and 
represents the first line of defense and focus of this thesis. 
B. THE 1950s REVISITED 
The Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) was established in 1951 among 
heightened fears of biological weapons use against the United States.353  Following the 
start of the Korean War, EIS was formed “as an early warning system against biological 
warfare and man-made epidemics.”354  It was originally composed of doctors, 
researchers, and scientists who served in 2-year assignments, and today has expanded to 
also include a surveillance and response unit for epidemics and chronic disease.  What is 
remarkable regarding U.S. vulnerability and preparedness for biological attacks is that the 
problems in the late 1940s and early 1950s that spawned EIS are much the same today 
following the 2001 anthrax attacks. 
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In October 1951, before the American Public Health Association, Colonel 
William L. Wilson of the Federal Civil Defense Administration said, “Biological warfare 
or ‘BW’ is not new!  Biological warfare defense is not a new subject either.  This type of 
warfare, so widely popularized today as a new subject, is one which we propose to clarify 
from the civil defense viewpoint.”355  Champions of contemporary biodefense find 
themselves opening with this same argument some 55 years later.  Yet what is most 
telling is the approach and mindset our predecessors took to addressing the problem.  
Two themes emerged in the 1950s.  First was the need for policymakers to take the 
situation seriously and recognize the BW threat from a civil defense perspective.  Second 
was that all the necessary tools and resources already existed to manage the problem.  
The following is a series of statements made in 1951, and later published in 1952 that 
summarize these points. 
Once identified, reporting of the agent and the marshalling of defenses 
against it should be much more rapid than in days gone by, and in our 
modern civilization the defense measures certainly could be more 
effective from the earliest attacks, provided we undertook our problems 
energetically, prepared for them intelligently, and deployed the means of 
defense promptly. 
Biological warfare defense is energetic public health practice. …Surely all 
of us now realize that if we really desire to do so, we can achieve 
epidemiological investigations which will protect our populations and we 
can report them promptly and effectively. …we must agree that we have 
come a long way toward the goal of means for overcoming any biological 
agent directed against us, if we will but prepare intelligently and 
effectively for that. 
The interrelationships and mutual supports between federal and state and 
other governmental and professional agencies and groups should be 
clearly recognized. While civil defense must coordinate and assure all of 
the defense measures required to be used against biological warfare, the 
various essential services are available. 
You have heard also of the United States Department of Agriculture’s 
Animal and Plant Disease Control agencies, and of the Department of 
Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service. We realize and appreciate the  
 
 
                                                 
355 William L. Wilson, “Biological Warfare Defense. 1. Introductory Remarks,” American Journal of 
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necessity for us to use most intelligently the vast and marvelous resources 
we have in our country today. …On the other hand, a very great deal 
depends upon individuals, each doing his part.356 
The concluding remarks in Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William 
Broad’s 2001 book titled Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War also 
bear repeating: 
A half century ago, a group of eminent citizens warned James Forrestal, 
the first Secretary of Defense, that the United States was defenseless 
against germ attacks. But its recommendations for better intelligence, 
more research, drug stockpiles, and medical surveillance systems were 
largely ignored. Over the next five decades, a series of American 
presidents confronted the problem, considering various remedies, and 
shuffled the issue in the “too hard” box. Such denial is understandable. 
Biodefense has no natural political constituency in Washington. The 
military-industrial complex that supports weapons systems has little 
interest in vaccines and public health. 
“Plans should be prepared for the establishment of adequate laboratories 
and vaccine production facilities and stockpiles of essential basic medical 
supplies in the event the danger from enemy attack appears immanent,” 
Forrestal’s committee concluded in 1949. “Prompt action should be taken 
to establish a civil defense program.” 
Those words could have been written yesterday. The question is whether 
the United States will be able to wait another fifty years to act on them. If 
we as a nation believe that the germ threat is a hoax, we are spending too 
much money on it. But if the danger is real, as we conclude it is, then the 
investment is much too haphazard and diffuse. We remain woefully 
unprepared for a calamity that would be unlike any this country has ever 
experienced.357 
The father of EIS, Dr. Alexander D. Langmuir, also concluded in 1952 that 
“sound organization can do much to abort the attack or mitigate its serious consequences.  
…The defensive organization is already in existence (in our health departments) and 
needs only modification to meet unnatural outbreaks or disease.” 358  Langmuir spoke of 
the need to increase the number of trained epidemiologists, to have an alert and effective 
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laboratory system, to have physicians and first responders trained in identifying the signs 
of bioterrorism, to have “a sound intelligence system based on prompt morbidity 
reporting,” and to have effective relationships between public health and law enforcement 
to characterize and attribute BW attacks.359  Such are also the findings of this thesis more 
than a half-century later. 
Building scientific laboratories for defensive biological research like the National 
Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, and creating an atmosphere of opacity 
versus transparency by classifying the work in the name of national security, while at the 
same time rejecting Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) protocols in the 
name of freedom and economic prosperity make for a dismal and counterproductive 
biodefense strategy.360  Regarding the BWC, “The United States undermines the treaty it 
helped create and its own moral authority when it cloaks the most significant aspects of 
its defensive work in secrecy. …A balance can be struck between the need to protect 
legitimate research and the imperative of investigating cheaters.”361   
As in the 1950s, the time has come once again to place increased emphasis on the 
ominous threat of bioterrorism.  Yet it must be done smartly to be effective and increase 
national preparedness.  While the defense establishment has a role to play, the majority of 
vulnerabilities and drivers for national security concern do not lie there.  U.S. biodefense 
strategy is more a civil defense concern as the future framework threatens general 
populations, global economies, and social stability and continuity of government.  
Determining the threat level and placing relative dangers in perspective is important.362  
However, if policymakers do this, and then collectively decide we must “do something,” 
then we must take measures that truly enhance security. 
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The biodefense arguments half a century ago still hold today.  Sometimes the best 
solutions are also the simplest and least costly―to improve organizational efficiency, 
communication, and coordination.  To build trusted networks and place value on the 
power of professional and personal relationships.  To enhance training and exercise 
programs for existing personnel, and to fix and better use current resources, rather than 
build new ones and create more bureaucracy at a higher price.  To improve BW detection 
through better surveillance, and to improve attribution though better interagency 
coordination.  We must learn the right lessons from history and bioterrorism case studies 
to properly allocate valuable resources and truly improve national preparedness.  
Otherwise, the United States could find itself 55 years from now revisiting the lessons of 
today. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Improve Detection Through Better Surveillance 
Detecting bioterrorism requires vigilant and effective surveillance.  Better 
surveillance requires more uniformity across state systems, an increase in the public 
health workforce and laboratory capacity, mandatory versus voluntary disease reporting, 
and stronger oversight mechanisms to ensure improvement and compliance in all of these 
areas.363  More systems like the National Biosurveillance Integration System 
(NBIS)―which use active surveillance at lower operational costs by leveraging data 
already collected for other means―should be developed and fielded.  Finally, 
consideration should be given to the sharing of any testing technologies between the 
defense establishment and state and local laboratories. 
Some states have enhanced their surveillance systems, but improvements have not 
been uniform across the country.364  In 2004, only half of states reported that their health 
departments could continuously receive and evaluate reports, and few reported the ability 
to rapidly detect an outbreak of an influenza-like illness.  In addition, few have links 
between public health, livestock, and veterinary surveillance communities to monitor 
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diseases in animals that may be spread to humans (zoonosis), such as the West Nile 
virus.365  While the principle of federalism and differences in state constitutions and laws 
are understandable, it also stands to reason that a deadly outbreak in any state could have 
devastating national effects.  If one truly believes the common adage “disease knows no 
borders,” then the federal government should ensure capacity and uniformity across state 
surveillance systems. 
Both the Rajneesh and anthrax cases show that during bioterror events, surges 
from hoaxes, normal testing, and “the worried well” immediately combine to overwhelm 
laboratories.  As of February 2004, some states have increased their capacity to perform 
tests, but this has not been consistent across the nation.366  All states participate in the 
CDC Laboratory Response Network, but only half have at least one public health 
laboratory with the appropriate equipment and trained staff to test and identifying 
biological agents.  Additionally, only half have a facility with the biosafety level required 
to handle agents such as anthrax.  Uniform efforts should be made to increase each state’s 
trained workforce and laboratory surge capacity, and to provide a BSL-3 facility in every 
state.367 
The list of nationally notifiable diseases is updated annually.  The CDC has also 
recommended detailed reporting standards via the “8-City Enhanced Terrorism 
Surveillance Project.”368  Yet much of disease surveillance reporting remains 
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voluntary.369  Sensitivity levels should be lowered, and more reporting requirements be 
made mandatory, in order to improve national preparedness for outbreaks of naturally 
occurring infectious disease or biological attacks. 
State legislatures must assume stronger oversight of regional and local health 
departments, while Congress should assume stronger oversight of state surveillance 
systems without politicizing their agencies.  This should come by way of both scheduled 
and random site visits and exercises.  CDC and the Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA) do visit state and local health departments to ensure grant monies 
are spent properly.370  However, these inspections are for very limited and focused 
concerns, sometimes unrelated to disease surveillance and detection.  The federal 
government should hold states, and states should hold local public health departments, 
accountable for surveillance and detection performance.  Oversight mechanisms should 
focus on standardization and conformity to state and national procedures, the adequacy of 
workforce and laboratory capacity, and compliance with mandatory reporting 
requirements within specified timelines. 
More systems like NBIS should be developed and fielded.  These reduce the costs 
of active surveillance by using existing data that is already routinely collected for other 
purposes.  This eliminates the need to develop and maintain more special purpose data 
collection systems.  Value-of-information considerations can also be used to reduce costs 
even further.  This decision theory principle determines the utility of whether to collect 
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certain kinds of information.371  Data mining principles can and should be used to probe 
web-based sources in both the secure and non-secure realms to enhance overall disease 
surveillance. 
Finally, consideration should be given to the sharing of any testing technologies 
from USAMRIID and the newly established NBACC with state and local laboratories.372  
If classified technologies or advanced scientific testing procedures do exist within DoD, 
these should be scrutinized and their classification reconsidered.  Thought should be 
given to sharing such capabilities (if they exist) with state laboratories to accelerate 
traditional growth culture testing.  This would speed up the detection timeline at state and 
local levels―the first line of defense where more than 66 percent of cases are detected 
and reported.373 
2. Improve Attribution through Better Coordination and Information 
Sharing374 
More bureaucracy is not the answer to improve interagency coordination.  New 
agencies, departments, and duty titles will not further BW attribution.  This was well 
understood in the 1950s when leading experts insisted that most of the tools and services 
needed were already in place.375  It is still true today when authorities maintain that 
“extraordinary measures are not necessary” to address this problem.376  Rather than more 
layers of bureaucracy, trusted networks should be developed from existing organizational 
structures by using “the strength of weak ties.”377 
The strength of weak ties is an organizational theory principle that says personal 
relationships or loose connections between organizations create more and shorter paths of 
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communication.378  This suggests that where interagency coordination is concerned, 
“removal of the average weak tie would do more ‘damage’ to transmission probabilities 
than would that of the average strong one.”379  Information can reach more people and 
traverse greater social distance when passed through weak ties rather than strong ones.  
Weak ties also play a role in promoting social cohesion, and this is especially true in 
professional and technical specialties that are well defined and restricted in size.380  
Furthermore, when people transfer from one organization to another, they often maintain 
working relationship established in the previous network, and bring these with them into 
the new network. 
…mobility [from changing jobs] sets up elaborate structures of bridging 
weak ties…that constitute operative networks in particular locations. 
Information and ideas thus flow more easily through the specialty, giving 
it some ‘sense of community,’ activated at meetings and conventions. 
Maintenance of weak ties may well be the most important consequence of 
such meetings.381 
The ability of weak ties to promote disease surveillance and detection was 
demonstrated in the successful identification of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) in 2003.  Dr. Stephen O. Cunnion, a retired outbreak specialist from the U.S. 
Navy, posted an e-mail on the International Society for Infectious Disease ProMED web 
site after hearing of suspicious events from friends in China.382  A copy of his original 
message follows: 
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PNEUMONIA - CHINA (GUANGDONG): RFI 
********************************** 
A ProMED-mail post 
<http://www.promedmail.org> 
ProMED-mail is a program of the 
International Society for Infectious Diseases 
<http://www.isid.org> 
 
Date: 10 Feb 2003 
From: Stephen O. Cunnion, MD, PhD, MPH <cunnion@erols.com> 
 
This morning I received this e-mail and then searched your 
archives and found nothing that pertained to it. Does anyone know 
anything about this problem? 
 
"Have you heard of an epidemic in Guangzhou? An acquaintance of 
mine from a teacher's chat room lives there and reports that the 
hospitals there have been closed and people are dying." 
 
Stephen O. Cunnion, MD, PhD, MPH 
International Consultants in Health, Inc 
Member ASTMandH, ISTM383 
 
This warning and similar queries started a sequence of events that eventually led to the 
successful management of the SARS epidemic.  Examples such as these show the value 
and power of personal relationships and weak ties.  These should be reinforced to 
promote collaborative networks and improve BW attribution.  
Communication among networks is based on trust.384  When it comes to sharing 
information between organizations, trust and mutual respect are critical and necessary 
components.  In the GAO report Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit 
Critical Infrastructure Protection, all organizations studied identified trust as “the 
essential underlying element to successful relationships and said that trust could be built 
only over time and, primarily, through personal relationships.”385  Other factors critical to 
the successful information sharing were: 
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• Creating effective and secure communication mechanisms such as regular 
meetings and secure web sites, 
• Obtaining support of senior managers regarding the sharing of sensitive 
information and the dedication of resources, and 
• Ensuring organizational leadership continuity.386 
The CDC and its “PulseNet,” “Epidemic Information Exchange,” and “Data Web” 
information exchange systems were instrumental to the findings of this study.387 
Programs should be developed that promote a culture of collaboration between 
the public health and law enforcement communities to improve attribution.  Worker 
exchange programs between CDC and FBI, between local public health departments, the 
coroner, and the sheriff’s department; and opportunities for state and local public health 
department employees to visit and/or briefly work at CDC are examples.  Obviously, 
long-term worker exchanges (more than just days or a few weeks) would be limited to 
non-technical specialties, and the administrative details of pay and benefits, security 
clearances, and lines of authority are beyond the scope of this thesis.  Lastly, to be truly 
effective each community’s organizational culture would have to support these exchange 
tours as a competitive and carrier advancing opportunity from the highest levels.  Where 
the CDC and FBI are concerned, the agency’s top employees should compete and be the 
first selected to promote such programs as career enhancing.  Where state and local 
health departments are concerned, some form of certification should accompany 
completion of exchange tours, and possibly even eligibility for additional federal funding 
for departments with graduates of the program. 
Finally, meetings such as conferences, seminars, and working groups should be 
routinely held that assemble public health and law enforcement personnel to exchange 
ideas on how to improve information sharing, joint investigation, and BW attribution.  
These meeting should be tailored to executive leadership, as well as management and 
lower-level workers and they should be multi-jurisdictional as much as possible.  The 
federal government and states should define mandatory minimum participation for their 
public health and law enforcement employees.  Minutes and findings should be recorded 
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and shared, and funding incentives could be tied to participation.  Collectively, worker 
exchange programs and joint conferences or working groups can form “weak ties” and 
build trust between organizations that will improve BW attribution through better 
coordination. 
3. Conduct Realistic Training and Large-Scale Exercises 
Realistic training teaches the probable yet subtle signatures of biological events to 
those most likely on the front lines of defense (Figure 7, page 72). 
Many terrorism events would not be identified in the high profile, sudden-
impact manner that most emergencies are portrayed. Instead, the observant 
physician, veterinarian, laboratory technician, surveillance data entry 
clerk, etc., who recognizes an unusual illness or cluster of illnesses or 
increases in requests for medical services or a specific diagnosis, will most 
likely be the first to identify the event. For this reason, training of all 
personnel associated with public health surveillance should be a priority of 
terrorism response preparedness.388 
Some have argued for decades of the need for increased training to improve 
disease surveillance and detection.  In 1952, Alexander D. Langmuir said, “It is obvious 
that a substantial increase in the number of trained and experienced epidemiologists will 
be required…”389  That same year John M. Hepler called for the training of sanitation 
personnel in epidemiological procedures, and to establish close ties with the 
communicable disease control officer, because “those health workers closest to the 
population will be the first to hear of any changes occurring in the population or the 
environment.”390  In October 1999 and before the U.S. anthrax attacks, former Soviet 
bioweapons engineer Dr. Kenneth Alibek testified before Congress saying: 
We must first be able to identify that an attack has occurred. This involves 
developing equipment…as well as providing training to hospital and 
health department personnel in recognizing and reporting the signs of a 
biological attack.391 
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After the attacks in December 2001, Alibek reaffirmed his position by saying, “We need 
to do many things in terms of our preparedness, our possible response, training 
people…”392  Therefore, to maximize preparedness states should train state and local 
public health staff in health surveillance, epidemiology, outbreak investigation, and 
worker biosafety issues.  Training must be coordinated with other federal, state, and local 
health programs “to ensure integration of bioterrorism preparedness and response 
activities.”393 
Frequent joint (public health and law enforcement) and multi-jurisdictional 
bioterrorism exercises should be accomplished.  The federal government should require 
states, and states should require their counties and cities, to perform these exercises 
annually at a minimum.  While federal and state-wide emergency response exercises do 
exist today such as the national Top Officials (TOPOFF) and California’s Golden 
Guardian exercises, these are broader in objective.  Table-top and operational exercises 
that explicitly test disease surveillance, reporting, detection, and attribution both within 
and across jurisdictional boundaries should be considered.  The federal government and 
states should publish and make results a matter of public record, and additional funding 
should be tied to superior performance as an incentive. 
Besides the obvious benefits of training and exercises, these programs work to 
build trust and form lasting relationships of weak ties as described earlier.  Joint training 
such as the forensic epidemiology course provides opportunities for public health and law 
enforcement to collaborate and become familiar with one another’s strengths and 
weaknesses.  Business cards are exchanged and friendships made during operational and 
table-top exercises.  Joint training programs and exercises, therefore, provide the 
synergistic effect of building trusted networks while at the same time increasing 
biodefense preparedness. 
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In summary, a comprehensive national biodefense strategy should make little 
distinction between mitigating the spread of naturally occurring infectious disease or 
malicious terrorist attacks.  Whether H5N1 bird flu, salmonella, or weaponized anthrax; 
successful consequence management of biological incidents requires many of the same 
policies, programs, infrastructure, organization, and training in order to be effective.  If 
we are to learn the right lessons from history and draw the correct conclusions from 
previous bioterror events, then genuine preparedness requires looking beyond new 
research facilities and government pharmaceutical contracts.  It requires an honest and 
introspective look within toward existing agencies and available resources.  It calls for 
seriously reconsidering U.S. policy toward BWC inspection protocols―a move that 
would be more consistent with nonproliferation and signal U.S. international leadership 
in step with, rather than counter to, its stated biodefense policies.  Finally, and above all, 
it demands improving biological detection and attribution capabilities through better 
surveillance and interagency cooperation in order to increase preparedness and close 
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